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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes before us on remand from the 
United States Supreme Court in light of its ruling in F.C.C. v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).  This 
case, like Fox, involves a tightening of the Federal 
Communications Commission‘s standards for the broadcast 
of fleeting indecent material.  Fox concerned the FCC‘s 
decision to abandon its safe harbor for expletives that are not 
repeated; this case considers the FCC‘s departure from its 
earlier policy exempting fleeting images from the scope of 
actionable indecency.  While we can understand the Supreme 
Court‘s desire that we re-examine our holdings in light of its 
opinion in Fox — since both involve the FCC‘s policy 
regarding ―fleeting material‖ — in Part A of this opinion we 
conclude that, if anything, Fox confirms our previous ruling 
in this case and that we should readopt our earlier analysis 
and holding that the Commission acted arbitrarily in this case.  
See CBS Corp. v. F.C.C., 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), 
vacated by F.C.C. v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009).  
Accordingly, in Part B of this opinion we again set forth our 
reasoning and conclusion that the FCC failed to acknowledge 
that its order in this case reflected a policy change and 
improperly imposed a penalty on CBS for violating a 
previously unannounced policy.  See id. at 188-89.  We have 
reconsidered certain other aspects of our previous opinion and 
will not remand, but, instead, will rule in Part B that CBS‘s 
petition for review is granted in toto. 
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Part A:  Our Prior Opinion and the Impact of Fox 
 
I. 
 
 The treatment of fleeting indecency over the airwaves 
has been the subject of much consideration by the FCC and 
the courts over the last thirty years.  This case involves a 
February 1, 2004 incident:  the exposure, for nine-sixteenths 
of one second, of Janet Jackson‘s bare right breast during the 
live halftime performance of the National Football League‘s 
Super Bowl XXXVIII.
1
  The FCC issued a forfeiture order 
against CBS in March 2006, imposing a penalty of $550,000.  
See In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees 
Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super 
Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, 21 F.C.C.R. 2760 (2006) 
(―Forfeiture Order‖).  We described the FCC‘s reasoning in 
our previous opinion: 
 
Affirming its preliminary findings, the 
Commission concluded the Halftime Show 
broadcast was indecent because it depicted a 
sexual organ and violated ―contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast 
medium.‖  Id. at ¶ 10.  In making this 
determination, the FCC relied on a contextual 
analysis to find the broadcast of Jackson‘s 
exposed breast was: (1) graphic and explicit, (2) 
shocking and pandering, and (3) fleeting.  Id. at 
¶ 14.  It further concluded that the brevity of the 
                                              
1
 Our original opinion in this matter provided additional 
factual and procedural background.  See CBS Corp., 535 F.3d 
at 171-74.  
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image was outweighed by the other two factors.  
Id.  The standard applied by the Commission is 
derived from its 2001 policy statement setting 
forth a two-part test for indecency: (1) ―the 
material must describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities,‖ and (2) it must 
be ―patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium.‖  In re Industry Guidance 
on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies 
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 
7999, 8002 ¶¶ 7-8 (2001) (emphasis in original) 
. . . . 
 
Additionally, the FCC determined CBS‘s 
actions in broadcasting the indecent image were 
―willful‖ and therefore sanctionable by a 
monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1). See Forfeiture Order at ¶ 15. 
CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 172.  CBS sought reconsideration 
under 47 C.F.R. § 1.106, which the FCC denied.  See In re 
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning 
Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII 
Halftime Show, 21 F.C.C.R. 6653 (2006).  Neither of these 
two orders acknowledged, much less explained, any change 
in the FCC‘s enforcement policy for fleeting indecent images.   
 
CBS filed a petition for review in our Court, 
contending that the FCC‘s ruling that the fleeting nude image 
was actionable indecency constituted a change in policy, and 
its application to CBS was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious 
8 
 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (―APA‖), 5 U.S.C. § 
706.  Specifically, CBS urged that, before the incident in 
question, FCC policy provided that the ―isolated use of 
expletives in broadcasts did not constitute actionable 
indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.‖  CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 
176 (citing See In re Application of Pacifica Found., 95 
F.C.C.2d 750 (1983)). 
 
 The FCC defended its actions on the basis that its 
earlier fleeting-material policy applied only to fleeting 
utterances and did not extend to fleeting images.
2
  We 
rejected this contention: 
 
During a span of nearly three decades, the 
Commission frequently declined to find 
broadcast programming indecent, its restraint 
punctuated only by a few occasions where 
programming contained indecent material so 
pervasive as to amount to ―shock treatment‖ for 
the audience. Throughout this period, the 
Commission consistently explained that isolated 
or fleeting material did not fall within the scope 
of actionable indecency. 
                                              
2
  The FCC abandoned its ―restrained enforcement policy for 
fleeting broadcast material,‖ at least as it applied to fleeting 
expletives, in its March 2004 order in In re Complaints 
Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding the Airing of 
the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 
(2004) (―Golden Globes‖).  See CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 180.  
Because that policy change post-dated the February 2004 
broadcast at issue in this case, it cannot serve as the basis for 
the penalty imposed on CBS.  See id. at 180-81.   
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At the time the Halftime Show was broadcasted 
by CBS, the FCC‘s policy on fleeting material 
was still in effect. The FCC contends its 
restrained policy applied only to fleeting 
utterances — specifically, fleeting expletives — 
and did not extend to fleeting images. But a 
review of the Commission‘s enforcement 
history reveals that its policy on fleeting 
material was never so limited. The FCC‘s 
present distinction between words and images 
for purposes of determining indecency 
represents a departure from its prior policy. 
Id. at 174-75. 
 
 Reviewing in detail the progression of FCC rulings 
leading up to the present, we could not find the distinction 
advocated by the FCC.  Indeed, we could only reach the 
opposite conclusion: 
 
[T]he balance of the evidence weighs heavily 
against the FCC‘s contention that its restrained 
enforcement policy for fleeting material 
extended only to fleeting words and not to 
fleeting images. As detailed, the Commission's 
entire regulatory scheme treated broadcasted 
images and words interchangeably for purposes 
of determining indecency. Therefore, it follows 
that the Commission‘s exception for fleeting 
material under that regulatory scheme likewise 
treated images and words alike. Three decades 
of FCC action support this conclusion. 
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Accordingly, we find the FCC‘s conclusion on 
this issue, even as an interpretation of its own 
policies and precedent, ―counter to the evidence 
before the agency‖ and ―so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or 
the product of agency expertise.‖ 
Id. at 188 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‟n of U.S., Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 
 Thus, we found that the ruling in this case represented 
a departure from prior policy that required an explanation: 
 
The Commission‘s determination that CBS‘s 
broadcast of a nine-sixteenths of one second 
glimpse of a bare female breast was actionably 
indecent evidenced the agency‘s departure from 
its prior policy. Its orders constituted the 
announcement of a policy change — that 
fleeting images would no longer be excluded 
from the scope of actionable indecency . . . .  
 
[A]n agency cannot ignore a substantial 
diversion from its prior policies.  See 
Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (agency must ―provide a 
reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies 
and standards are being deliberately changed, 
not casually ignored‖).  As the Supreme Court 
explained in State Farm, an agency must be 
afforded great latitude to change its policies, but 
it must justify its actions by articulating a 
reasoned analysis behind the change . . . . 
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CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 181-82 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. 
at 42-43). 
 
 We then noted that in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit had analyzed under State Farm the FCC‘s change in 
its fleeting-expletive policy (announced in its Golden Globes 
order, after the 2004 Halftime Show broadcast at issue here) 
and had ―rejected the agency‘s proffered rationale as 
‗disconnected from the actual policy implemented by the 
Commission.‘‖  Id. at 183 (quoting 489 F.3d 444, 459 n.8 (2d 
Cir. 2007), rev‟d, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800).  We then 
distinguished the FCC‘s actions in Fox from its order in this 
case: 
 
There, as Judge Leval noted in dissent, the FCC 
provided an explanation for changing its policy 
on fleeting expletives. The critical question 
splitting the court was whether that explanation 
was adequate under State Farm. Here, unlike in 
Fox, the FCC has not offered any 
explanation — reasoned or otherwise — for 
changing its policy on fleeting images. Rather, 
the FCC asserts it never had a policy of 
excluding fleeting images from the scope of 
actionable indecency, and therefore no policy 
change occurred when it determined that the 
Halftime Show‘s fleeting image of Janet 
Jackson's breast was actionably indecent. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Because our analysis of three decades 
of FCC enforcement contradicted the Commission‘s assertion 
in this regard, we concluded that ―the FCC‘s new policy of 
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including fleeting images within the scope of actionable 
indecency is arbitrary and capricious under State Farm and 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore invalid as 
applied to CBS.‖  Id. at 189. 
 
 We next engaged in a discussion regarding the degree 
of scienter necessary for the imposition of a forfeiture, and 
concluded the opinion by remanding to the agency, finding 
this course of action to be appropriate where the agency has 
issued an arbitrary decision.  See id. at 209. 
 
 Eight months later the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Fox, on certiorari from the Second Circuit.  See 
Fox, 129 S.Ct. 1800.  As noted above, the issue in that case 
was ―the adequacy of the Federal Communications 
Commission‘s explanation of its decision that [the statutory 
prohibition on indecent language] sometimes forbids the 
broadcasting of indecent expletives even when the offensive 
words are not repeated,‖ not, as here, the question whether the 
FCC‘s order amounted to a policy change.3   Id. at 1805 
(emphasis added).   
                                              
3
 In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that, in the orders 
at issue in Fox: 
 
The Commission forthrightly acknowledged 
that its recent actions have broken new ground, 
taking account of inconsistent ―prior 
Commission and staff action‖ and explicitly 
disavowing them as ―no longer good law.‖ 
Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980 . . . . There 
is no doubt that the Commission knew it was 
making a change.  That is why it declined to 
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The Court reviewed the statutory and regulatory 
background in the introductory section of the opinion, 
concluding with a discussion of the FCC‘s ruling in Golden 
Globes, where ―the Commission took one step further by 
declaring for the first time that a nonliteral (expletive) use of 
the F- and S-Words could be actionably indecent, even when 
the word is used only once,‖ Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.  The 
Supreme Court observed: 
 
The [Golden Globes] order acknowledged that 
―prior Commission and staff action have 
indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of 
the ‗F-Word‘ . . . are not indecent or would not 
be acted upon.‖  It explicitly ruled that ―any 
such interpretation is no longer good law.‖  It 
―clarif[ied] . . . that the mere fact that specific 
words or phrases are not sustained or repeated 
does not mandate a finding that material that is 
otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast 
medium is not indecent.‖  Because, however, 
―existing precedent would have permitted this 
broadcast,‖ the Commission determined that 
―NBC and its affiliates necessarily did not have 
the requisite notice to justify a penalty.‖ 
Id. at 1808 (internal citations omitted). 
                                                                                                     
assess penalties; and it relied on the Golden 
Globes Order as removing any lingering doubt.  
Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13308. 
 
Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1812. 
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 The Court next considered the case before it, which 
involved two instances of celebrities‘ use of the ―F-Word‖ in 
live broadcasts.  Id. (discussing Cher‘s and Nicole Richie‘s 
statements at two consecutive Billboard Music Awards 
broadcasts).  The Commission had initially issued Notices of 
Apparent Liability, but imposed no fines.  See In re 
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts 
Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 
2664 (2006).  In further proceedings, the Commission gave 
Fox the opportunity to object, then upheld the indecency 
findings.  See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television 
Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 
21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) (―Remand Order‖).  The FCC‘s 
order explained its reason for departing from the position that 
fleeting expletives were exempt from otherwise applicable 
indecency standards: 
 
In the Commission‘s view, ―granting an 
automatic exemption for ‗isolated or fleeting‘ 
expletives unfairly forces viewers (including 
children)‖ to take ―‗the first blow‘‖ and would 
allow broadcasters ―to air expletives at all hours 
of a day so long as they did so one at a time.‖ 
Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (internal citations omitted).  The FCC 
appeared to hedge to some degree as to the extent of, and 
timing of, its change in policy for fleeting material, but, as the 
Supreme Court noted, it ―made clear [that] the Golden Globes 
Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be 
actionably indecent, and the Commission disavowed the 
bureau-level decisions and its own dicta that had said 
otherwise.‖  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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 Regarding the adequacy of the FCC‘s explanation for 
its policy change, the Court rejected the Second Circuit‘s 
view that an agency must ―make clear ‗why the original 
reasons for adopting the [displaced] rule or policy are no 
longer dispositive‘ as well as ‗why the new rule effectuates 
the statute as well as or better than the old rule.‘‖  Fox, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1810 (quoting Fox, 489 F.3d at 456-57) (internal 
quotations omitted; alteration in original).  It held: 
 
To be sure, the requirement that an agency 
provide reasoned explanation for its action 
would ordinarily demand that it display 
awareness that it is changing position.  An 
agency may not, for example, depart from a 
prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard 
rules that are still on the books.  See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  And of 
course the agency must show that there are 
good reasons for the new policy.  But it need 
not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the 
reasons for the new policy are better than the 
reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new 
policy is permissible under the statute, that there 
are good reasons for it, and that the agency 
believes it to be better, which the conscious 
change of course adequately indicates. 
Id. at 1811. 
 
 The Court concluded that, in that case, the 
Commission‘s ―reasons for expanding the scope of its 
enforcement activity were entirely rational‖: 
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It was certainly reasonable to determine that it 
made no sense to distinguish between literal and 
nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring 
repetitive use to render only the latter indecent.  
As the Commission said with regard to 
expletive use of the F-Word, ―the word‘s power 
to insult and offend derives from its sexual 
meaning.‖  And the Commission's decision to 
look at the patent offensiveness of even isolated 
uses of sexual and excretory words fits with the 
context-based approach we sanctioned in 
[F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation], 438 U.S. 
[726], 750 [(1978)]. Even isolated utterances 
can be made in ―pander[ing,] . . . vulgar and 
shocking‖ manners, and can constitute harmful 
―‗first blow[s]‘‖ to children.  It is surely rational 
(if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor 
for single words would ―likely lead to more 
widespread use of the offensive language.‖ 
Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1812-13 (internal citations omitted).  
Notably, the Court‘s discussion of the Commission‘s action 
concluded with the following statement:  ―[T]he agency‘s 
decision not to impose any forfeiture or other sanction 
precludes any argument that it is arbitrarily punishing parties 
without notice of the potential consequences of their action.‖  
Id. at 1813. 
 
 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Second Circuit‘s 
order and upheld the FCC‘s decision. 
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II. 
 
 We must decide the extent to which Fox affects our 
previous ruling in this case.  We conclude that, if anything, 
the Supreme Court‘s decision fortifies our original opinion, in 
two ways. 
 
 For one thing, in Fox, unlike in this case, the FCC 
acknowledged that its orders had ―broken new ground,‖ as 
noted above.  See 129 S. Ct. at 1812.  The Supreme Court 
specifically noted that the FCC‘s ―decision not to impose any 
forfeiture or other sanction‖ in that case signaled its 
recognition that assessing penalties based on violations of 
previously unannounced policies would amount to ―arbitrarily 
punishing parties without notice of the potential consequences 
of their actions.‖  Id. at 1813.  The same logic implies that the 
FCC erred in imposing a fine on CBS in this case, as the 
chronology of events that are the subject of these cases 
demonstrates. 
 
 The FCC Enforcement Bureau‘s original, 2003 ruling 
in Golden Globes applied its then-controlling policy of 
exempting all fleeting indecent material from enforcement, 
determining that the singer Bono‘s use of the ―F- Word‖ 
(―this is really, really f-- brilliant‖) did ―not fall within the 
scope of the Commission‘s indecency prohibition.‖  CBS 
Corp., 535 F.3d at 177 (quoting In re Complaints Against 
Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859, ¶ 6 
(FCC Enforcement Bureau 2003)).  But, in March 2004, the 
full Commission reversed the Enforcement Bureau‘s decision, 
overruling all of its prior cases that held fleeting expletives 
were not actionable.  The Commission declined to impose a 
18 
 
penalty on the Golden Globes broadcasters, however, because 
―‗existing precedent would have permitted [the Golden Globe 
Awards] broadcast‘ and therefore it would be ‗inappropriate‘ 
to sanction licensees for conduct prior to notice of policy 
change.‖  Id. at 178 (quoting Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 
4981-82).   
 
The expletive utterances by Cher and Nicole Richie 
that were considered in Fox took place, respectively, during 
the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards telecasts, before 
the full Commission‘s March 2004 Golden Globes decision.  
Accordingly, and applying the same rationale as in Golden 
Globes, the FCC declined to impose a fine.  As the Fox Court 
observed and affirmed, the decision not to impose a fine in 
that case signaled the FCC‘s understanding that imposing 
sanctions for conduct that occurred before the FCC‘s policy 
change was announced would raise due process concerns.  
See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1813. 
 
The same principle applies here.  The relevant 
Halftime Show broadcast occurred in February 2004, 
preceding the FCC‘s ruling in Golden Globes.  But despite its 
earlier consistent policy exempting all fleeting material — 
words and images — from its indecency rules, see CBS 
Corp., 535 F.3d at 188, the FCC assessed a fine against CBS.  
Fox confirms our earlier observation that because the 
Commission did not announce any change in its fleeting-
material policy until March 2004, and because the offensive 
conduct in this case (like the offending conduct in Golden 
Globes and Fox) preceded that date, the FCC‘s assessment of 
a forfeiture and imposition of a penalty against CBS 
constitutes arbitrary, and therefore unlawful, punishment.  
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Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1813; see also CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 180-
81.   
 
The FCC and our dissenting colleague contend that, in 
all events, the FCC‘s decision in Young Broadcasting of San 
Francisco, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 1751 (2004), issued just days 
before CBS‘s Halftime Show, provided CBS with adequate 
notice that the FCC might impose a forfeiture for fleeting 
nude images.  But as we pointed out in our earlier opinion, 
the 2004 Young Broadcasting decision was a non-final notice 
of apparent liability; ―the final disposition of Young 
Broadcasting was still unresolved‖ at the time of the Halftime 
Show broadcast.  Id. at 187 & n.18.  The decision therefore 
reflects only ―tentative conclusions‖ of the FCC, and, in our 
view, provides insufficient notice of the FCC‘s official policy 
on fleeting nude images, particularly when viewed in the 
context of the agency‘s consistent refusal over three decades 
to consider such fleeting material indecent, to justify the 
imposition of sanctions against CBS. 
 
Therefore, we must reaffirm our conclusion that the 
penalty imposed in this case is arbitrary unless we find, 
contrary to the extensive analysis in our earlier opinion, that 
the FCC‘s pre-Golden Globes fleeting-material policy did not 
also apply to fleeting images.  But, here again, Fox supports 
our previous conclusion.  The Commission, and our 
dissenting colleague, point to one small portion of the 
background section in the Supreme Court‘s lengthy Fox 
opinion as support for the position that the FCC‘s fleeting-
material policy never applied to images but was always 
restricted to words.  But we discern no such meaning in the 
relevant passage, which briefly observed: 
20 
 
Although the Commission had expanded its 
enforcement beyond the ―repetitive use of 
specific words or phrases,‖ it preserved a 
distinction between literal and nonliteral (or 
―expletive‖) uses of evocative language. The 
Commission explained that each literal 
―description or depiction of sexual or excretory 
functions must be examined in context to 
determine whether it is patently offensive,‖ but 
that ―deliberate and repetitive use . . . is a 
requisite to a finding of indecency‖ when a 
complaint focuses solely on the use of nonliteral 
expletives. 
129 S. Ct. at 1807 (quoting In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 
F.C.C.R. 1191, 2699, ¶ 13 (1987)).   
 
The FCC argues that images fall into the category of 
literal ―descriptions or depictions‖ of sexual organs or 
functions, and that the Court‘s language indicates that the 
FCC‘s previous fleeting-material policy applied only to non-
literal, or expletive, depictions or descriptions, and not, as we 
previously concluded, to fleeting images as well as 
expletives.  We disagree. 
 
 First, we do not see how this summary recitation of the 
Commission‘s opinions affects the reasoning or result in our 
case.  It appears in the Court‘s background discussion of the 
FCC‘s historical approach to indecent language, and is neither 
reasoning nor holding; it is mere characterization.  Second, 
this language narrowly addresses words and phrases, with no 
discussion of images.  Although the phrase ―description or 
depiction,‖ considered in isolation, could be construed to 
21 
 
include images, Justice Scalia is paraphrasing the language of 
the FCC‘s 1987 Pacifica Foundation opinion, involving 
words alone, in which the complete phrase used by the FCC 
was ―speech involving the description or depiction of sexual 
or excretory functions.‖4  In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 
                                              
4
 The full text of the relevant paragraph from Pacifica 
Foundation is as follows: 
 
While speech that is indecent 
must involve more than an 
isolated use of an offensive 
word . . . , repetitive use of 
specific words or phrases is not 
an absolute requirement for a 
finding of indecency.  If a 
complaint focuses solely on the 
use of expletives, we believe that 
under the legal standards set forth 
in Pacifica, deliberate and 
repetitive use in a patently 
offensive manner is a requisite to 
a finding of indecency.  When a 
complaint goes beyond the use of 
expletives, however, repetition of 
specific words or phrases is not 
necessarily an element critical to a 
determination of indecency.  
Rather, speech involving the 
description or depiction of sexual 
or excretory functions must be 
examined in context to determine 
whether it is patently offensive 
22 
 
F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶ 13 (1987), quoted in Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 
1807.  As the dissent concedes, dissenting op. at 26-27 n.7, 
Fox says nothing at all about images.  Nor does it suggest that 
the FCC‘s previous fleeting-material policy applied only to 
―words,‖ or distinguished between words and images, as the 
Commission originally argued to us (an argument we 
forcefully rejected after reviewing three decades of rulings).  
Indeed, the Fox Court had no occasion to consider the 
application of the FCC‘s pre-Golden Globes fleeting-material 
policy to images, since that case involved the use of spoken 
fleeting expletives.
5
   
                                                                                                     
under contemporary community 
standards applicable to the 
broadcast medium.  The mere fact 
that specific words or phrases are 
not repeated does not mandate a 
finding that material that is 
otherwise patently offensive to the 
broadcast medium is not indecent. 
 
2 F.C.C.R. at 2699 ¶ 13 (emphases added). 
 
5
 Our dissenting colleague contends that the Supreme 
Court‘s omission of any discussion of fleeting images in Fox 
―strongly suggests‖ that images never fell within the FCC‘s 
fleeting-material policy.  Dissenting op. at 28.  By contrast, 
we are unwilling to read the Court‘s silence as overruling our 
conclusion, based on a careful review of three decades of 
FCC precedent to discern the agency‘s policy on precisely 
this issue, that the FCC historically did not distinguish 
between fleeting images and words.  See 535 F.3d at 188 
(―[T]he Commission‘s entire regulatory scheme treated 
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More to the point, read in context, this language does 
not refer to the FCC‘s pre-Golden Globes fleeting-material 
policy at all.  Instead, it describes the evolution of the 
Commission‘s overall approach to a separate issue, i.e., 
whether ―its enforcement power was limited to ‗deliberate, 
repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the 
George Carlin monologue.‘‖6  Id. at 1807 (quoting Pacifica 
Found., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699 ¶ 12).  Critically, the relevant 
portion of the Pacifica Foundation opinion that Fox quoted 
clearly distinguished between these two concepts, explaining 
that ―speech that is indecent must involve more than an 
isolated,‖ i.e., fleeting, ―use of an offensive word,‖ but that 
―repetitive use of specific words or phrases‖ (i.e., the 
expletive words or phrases from the Carlin monologue) was 
not required.  Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699 ¶ 13 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court in the quoted 
language from Fox, and the FCC in the Pacifica Foundation 
opinion that Fox quoted, were focused entirely on the FCC‘s 
earlier policy (arising out of the Carlin monologue) regarding 
the ―‗use of specific words or phrases‘‖ as a prerequisite to a 
finding of indecency, not the question whether the reference 
to a particular word or image that might otherwise be deemed 
indecent was passing or fleeting in nature.  Just as Fox 
involved spoken fleeting expletives, not fleeting images, 
                                                                                                     
broadcasted images and words interchangeably for purposes 
of determining indecency.  Therefore, it follows that the 
Commission‘s exception for fleeting material under that 
regulatory scheme likewise treated words and images alike.‖).  
Images simply were not involved in the case. 
 
6
 See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1806, and CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 
175, for additional background on the Carlin monologue.  
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Pacifica Foundation involved sustained, repeated use of 
expletives and sexually explicit language, not fleeting words 
or images.
7
   
 
Moreover, the very next paragraph of Fox confirms 
that neither the Supreme Court nor the FCC interpreted 
Pacifica Foundation‘s distinction between literal and non-
literal uses of specific words or phrases to impact the 
otherwise applicable policy for fleeting material.  Fox, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1807.  In that paragraph, quoting an FCC policy 
statement from 2001, the Court made clear that, even after 
Pacifica Foundation, the exception for fleeting material still 
applied, separate and apart from any distinction arising 
between ―literal‖ and ―non-literal‖ words referring to sexual 
or excretory functions.  Quoting a 2001 FCC policy 
statement, the Court said, ―‗No single factor,‘ the 
Commission said, ‗generally provides the basis for an 
indecency finding,‘ but ‗where sexual or excretory references 
have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in 
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a 
                                              
7
 Pacifica Foundation concerned a radio station‘s airing of a 
program entitled ―Shocktime America,‖ which allegedly 
contained a narration and song lyrics using words and phrases 
such as ―eat shit,‖ ―mother-fucker,‖ and ―fuck the U.S.A.,‖ 
and a program featuring excerpts from a play with dramatic 
readings of sexual fantasies and containing language highly 
descriptive of sexual and excretory activities.  Pacifica 
defended that the Shocktime remarks were not scripted, and 
asserted that the language of the play was taken out of context 
and the broadcast was at night when children would not be 
listening.   
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finding of indecency.‘‖  Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807 (quoting In re 
Industry Guidance on the Commission‟s Case Law 
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies 
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8003 
¶ 10, 8008 ¶ 17 (2001) (―Industry Guidance‖)) (emphasis 
added).
8
   
 
If we were to read the Supreme Court‘s background 
discussion in Fox as indicating that the history of FCC 
enforcement in the area of fleeting material recognized an 
exception only for non-literal expletives, to the exclusion of 
images, we would be accusing the Supreme Court of 
rewriting history.  This is because, in Young Broadcasting, 
which involved a fleeting image of a body part much like the 
one presented here, the Commission had the opportunity to 
explain that, after Pacifica Foundation, its fleeting-material 
policy did not apply to images.  But the FCC did not say that, 
nor did it mention, much less rely on, Pacifica Foundation in 
analyzing the broadcast images at issue in that case.
9
  See 
Young Broadcasting, 19 F.C.C.R. at 1755 ¶ 12 & n.35.    
                                              
8
 Interestingly, we cited this exact language as evidence of 
the FCC‘s ―restrained enforcement policy‖ for fleeting 
indecent material in our earlier opinion.  See CBS Corp., 535 
F.3d at 177.   
 
9
 Just as Young Broadcasting did not mention Pacifica 
Foundation‘s literal / non-literal distinction, Fox does not 
reference or attempt to reconcile Young Broadcasting, 
confirming that the Court did not consider, much less decide, 
whether the FCC‘s pre-Golden Globes fleeting-material 
policy applied to images as well as words.   
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Instead, the FCC noted the fact that ―the actual 
exposure of the performer‘s penis‖ in that case ―was fleeting 
in that it occurred for less than a second.‖  Id.  It then 
compared  the overall circumstances in the case to other cases 
in which it had applied the fleeting-material exception, and 
held that Young Broadcasting was different — an exception 
to the exception — because ―the material was apparently 
intended to pander to, titillate and shock viewers‖ and 
because the station knew in advance that ―the interview 
involved performers who appear nude in order to manipulate 
and stretch their genitalia,‖ but ―failed to take adequate 
precautions to ensure that no actionably indecent material was 
broadcast.‖  Id. at 1755-56 ¶¶ 12-13 & n.35; see also CBS 
Corp., 535 F.3d at 186 & n.16-17.   
 
The Commission did not distinguish Young 
Broadcasting because it involved images rather than words, 
and its language demonstrates that it viewed the case as just 
another ―instance‖ involving ―fleeting remarks in live, 
unscripted broadcasts.‖  See Young Broadcasting, 19 
F.C.C.R. at 1755 ¶ 12 (―We reject Young‘s assertion that this 
material is equivalent to other instances in which the 
Commission has ruled that fleeting remarks in live, unscripted 
broadcasts do not meet the indecency definition.‖).  As we 
pointed out in our previous CBS opinion, had the FCC 
believed that its fleeting-material policy categorically did not 
apply to sexually explicit images, it most certainly would 
have said so rather than relying on distinctions that could 
apply to all fleeting material — remarks and images alike.  Id. 
at 187.  The FCC has not persuaded us that the fleeting-
material exception was ever limited to words or expletives, 
and it cannot do so when in Young Broadcasting it treated a 
fleeting image just as it would have treated fleeting words.   
27 
 
 
Considering all of these facts, we do not see any basis 
to conclude that Fox alters our previous analysis of the 
fleeting-material exception.  At bottom, the Commission 
attempts to convert a passing reference in Fox‘s background 
section into a holding that undermines what the opinion 
otherwise makes clear:  an agency may not apply a policy to 
penalize conduct that occurred before the policy was 
announced.  The Commission‘s argument also rewrites 
history, marginalizing the Supreme Court‘s recognition in 
Fox that Golden Globes reflected a clear change in FCC‘s 
fleeting-material policy, and ignoring the agency‘s consistent 
practice — over three decades before its order in this case — 
of exempting all fleeting material, whether words or images, 
from enforcement under its indecency policy.
10
   
                                              
10
 Our prior opinion chronicled that history at length.  As we 
discussed: 
 
The Commission‘s conclusion on the nature 
and scope of its indecency regime-including its 
fleeting material policy – is at odds with the 
history of its actions in regulating indecent 
broadcasts.  In the nearly three decades between 
the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Pacifica 
Foundation and CBS‘s broadcast of the 
Halftime Show, the FCC had never varied its 
approach to indecency regulation based on the 
format of broadcasted content.  Instead, the 
FCC consistently applied identical standards 
and engaged in identical analyses when 
reviewing complaints of potential indecency 
28 
 
Thus, we conclude that Fox does not alter our 
reasoning or initial resolution of this case. 
 
Part B:  Opinion Regarding the Merits 
 
In reasoning through Part A of this opinion, we 
referred extensively to our prior opinion, which the Supreme 
Court vacated before remanding the case to us in light of Fox.  
While we ordinarily would simply reinstate our prior opinion 
after determining that Fox did not undermine it, we cannot do 
that here, for two reasons.  First, the previous opinion was a 
unanimous opinion authored by Judge Scirica, whereas the 
opinion we now will issue is non-unanimous, with Judge 
Scirica dissenting.  Second, the new majority does not believe 
that the earlier opinion‘s discussion of the scienter required 
for a violation was necessary, and we decline to readopt that 
portion of the analysis. 
 
Accordingly, we do not reinstate our previous opinion.  
Instead, we incorporate below those portions of the opinion 
that we wish to readopt as part of our resolution of this case.
11
 
 
                                                                                                     
whether the complaints were based on words or 
images. 
 
CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 184. 
 
11
 We incorporate the pertinent portions of our previous 
opinion as they were filed on July 21, 2008 and amended on 
August 6, 2008.  Thus, the citation information in Part B of 
our opinion is current as of that date and does not reflect any 
subsequent updates. 
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* * * 
 
In this petition for review, CBS appeals orders of the 
Federal Communications Commission imposing a monetary 
forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for the broadcast of 
―indecent‖ material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 
C.F.R. § 73.3999.  The sanctions stem from CBS‘s live 
broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, in 
which two performers deviated from the show‘s script 
resulting in the exposure of a bare female breast on camera, a 
deceitful and manipulative act that lasted nine-sixteenths of 
one second.  CBS transmitted the image over public airwaves, 
resulting in punitive action by the FCC. 
 
CBS challenges the Commission‘s orders on 
constitutional, statutory, and public policy grounds.  Two of 
the challenges are paramount: (1) whether the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, in determining that CBS‘s 
broadcast of a fleeting image of nudity was actionably 
indecent; and (2) whether the Commission, in applying three 
theories of liability – traditional respondeat superior doctrine, 
an alternative theory of vicarious liability based on CBS‘s 
duties as a broadcast licensee, and the ―willfulness‖ standard 
of the forfeiture statute – properly found CBS violated the 
indecency provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 
73.3999.  We will vacate the FCC‘s orders. 
 
I. 
 
 On February 1, 2004, CBS presented a live broadcast 
of the National Football League‘s Super Bowl XXXVIII, 
which included a halftime show produced by MTV 
30 
 
Networks.
12  Nearly 90 million viewers watched the Halftime 
Show, which began at 8:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time and 
lasted about fifteen minutes.  The Halftime Show featured a 
variety of musical performances by contemporary recording 
artists, with Janet Jackson as the announced headlining act 
and Justin Timberlake as a ―surprise guest‖ for the final 
minutes of the show.   
 
 Timberlake was unveiled on stage near the conclusion 
of the Halftime Show.  He and Jackson performed his popular 
song ―Rock Your Body‖ as the show‘s finale.  Their 
performance, which the FCC contends involved sexually 
suggestive choreography, portrayed Timberlake seeking to 
dance with Jackson, and Jackson alternating between 
accepting and rejecting his advances.  The performance ended 
with Timberlake singing, ―gonna have you naked by the end 
of this song,‖ and simultaneously tearing away part of 
Jackson‘s bustier.  CBS had implemented a five-second audio 
delay to guard against the possibility of indecent language 
being transmitted on air, but it did not employ similar 
precautionary technology for video images.  As a result, 
Jackson‘s bare right breast was exposed on camera for nine-
sixteenths of one second. 
 
 Jackson‘s exposed breast caused a sensation and 
resulted in a large number of viewer complaints to the Federal 
Communications Commission.
13
  In response, the 
                                              
12
 At that time, both CBS and MTV Networks were 
divisions of Viacom, Inc.   
 
13
 The record is unclear on the actual number of complaints 
received from unorganized, individual viewers.  In its brief, 
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Commission‘s Enforcement Bureau issued a letter of inquiry 
asking CBS to provide more information about the broadcast 
along with a video copy of the entire Super Bowl program.  
CBS supplied the requested materials, including a script of 
the Halftime Show, and issued a public statement of apology 
for the incident.  CBS stated Jackson and Timberlake‘s 
wardrobe stunt was unscripted and unauthorized, claiming it 
had no advance notice of any plan by the performers to 
deviate from the script. 
 
 On September 22, 2004, the Commission issued a 
Notice of Apparent Liability finding CBS had apparently 
violated federal law and FCC rules restricting the broadcast of 
indecent material.  After its review, the Commission 
determined CBS was apparently liable for a forfeiture penalty 
of $550,000.
14
  CBS submitted its Opposition to the Notice of 
Apparent Liability on November 5, 2004. 
                                                                                                     
the FCC asserts it received ―‗an unprecedented number‘ of 
complaints about the nudity broadcast during the halftime 
show.‖  FCC Br. at 12 (citation omitted).  CBS disputes the 
calculation and significance of the viewer complaints.  See 
CBS Reply Br. at 15 n.6 (―Of the ‗over 542,000 complaints 
concerning the broadcast‘ the FCC claims to have received, 
over 85 percent are form complaints generated by single-
interest groups.  Approximately twenty percent of the 
complaints are duplicates, with some individual complaints 
appearing in the record up to 37 times.‖ (citations omitted)). 
14
 This figure represented the aggregate of proposed 
penalties against individual CBS stations.  At the time the 
Commission issued its Notice of Apparent Liability, 
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 The Commission issued a forfeiture order over CBS‘s 
opposition on March 15, 2006, imposing a forfeiture penalty 
of $550,000.  In re Complaints Against Various Television 
Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of 
the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, 21 F.C.C.R. 2760 
(2006) (―Forfeiture Order‖).  Affirming its preliminary 
findings, the Commission concluded the Halftime Show 
broadcast was indecent because it depicted a sexual organ and 
violated ―contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium.‖  Id. at ¶ 10.  In making this 
determination, the FCC relied on a contextual analysis to find 
the broadcast of Jackson‘s exposed breast was: (1) graphic 
and explicit, (2) shocking and pandering, and (3) fleeting.  Id. 
at ¶ 14.  It further concluded that the brevity of the image was 
outweighed by the other two factors.  Id.  The standard 
applied by the Commission is derived from its 2001 policy 
statement setting forth a two-part test for indecency: (1) ―the 
material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or 
activities,‖ and (2) it must be ―patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium.‖  In re Industry Guidance on the Commission‟s 
Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement 
Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 
8002 ¶¶ 7-8 (2001) (emphasis in original).  The Commission 
had informed broadcasters in its 2001 policy statement that in 
performing the second step of the test – measuring the 
offensiveness of any particular broadcast – it would look to 
three factors: ―(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the 
                                                                                                     
forfeiture penalties for indecency violations were statutorily 
capped at $27,500.  The Commission proposed the maximum 
penalty for each CBS station. 
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description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or 
activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at 
length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been 
presented for its shock value.‖  Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted). 
 
 Additionally, the FCC determined CBS‘s actions in 
broadcasting the indecent image were ―willful‖ and therefore 
sanctionable by a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1). See id. at ¶ 15.  Adopting the definition of 
―willful‖ found in section 312(f)(1) of the Communications 
Act,
15
 the Commission offered three explanations for its 
determination of willfulness.  Id.  First, the FCC found CBS 
―acted willfully because it consciously and deliberately 
broadcast the halftime show, whether or not it intended to 
broadcast nudity . . . .‖  Id.  Second, the FCC found CBS 
acted willfully because it ―consciously and deliberately failed 
to take reasonable precautions to ensure that no actionably 
indecent material was broadcast.‖  Id.  Finally, the FCC 
applied a respondeat superior theory in finding CBS 
vicariously liable for the willful actions of its agents, Jackson 
and Timberlake.  Id. 
                                              
15
 This section of the Communications Act provides: ―The 
term ‗willful‘, when used with reference to the commission or 
omission of any act, means the conscious and deliberate 
commission or omission of such act, irrespective of any intent 
to violate any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation 
of the Commission authorized by this Act or by a treaty 
ratified by the United States.‖  47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1). 
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 On April 14, 2006, CBS submitted a Petition for 
Reconsideration under 47 C.F.R. § 1.106, raising several 
arguments against the Commission‘s findings and 
conclusions.  In its Order on Reconsideration, the FCC 
rejected CBS‘s statutory and constitutional challenges and 
reaffirmed its imposition of a $550,000 forfeiture.  In re 
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning 
Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII 
Halftime Show, 21 F.C.C.R. 6653 (2006) (―Reconsideration 
Order‖).  The Reconsideration Order revised the 
Commission‘s approach for determining CBS‘s liability 
under the willfulness standard.  The Commission reiterated its 
application of vicarious liability in the form of respondeat 
superior and its determination that CBS was directly liable 
for failing to take adequate measures to prevent the broadcast 
of indecent material.  See id. at ¶ 16.  But it abandoned its 
position that CBS acted willfully under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) 
by intentionally broadcasting the Halftime Show irrespective 
of its intent to broadcast the particular content included in the 
show.  Instead, it determined CBS could be liable ―given the 
nondelegable nature of broadcast licensees‘ responsibility for 
their programming.‖  Id. at ¶ 23.  The Commission has since 
elaborated on this aspect of the Reconsideration Order, 
explaining it as a separate theory of liability whereby CBS 
can be held vicariously liable even for the acts of its 
independent contractors because it holds non-delegable duties 
as a broadcast licensee to operate in the public interest and to 
avoid broadcasting indecent material.  See, e.g., FCC Br. at 
44-45. 
 
 CBS timely filed a petition for review of the 
Reconsideration Order on July 28, 2006.  It challenges the 
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FCC‘s orders on several grounds, and both parties are 
supported by briefing from several amici.  
 
II. 
 
 Our standard of review of agency decisions is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
706.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we ―hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions‖ that are found to be ―arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.‖  Id. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‟n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). 
 
 The scope of review under the ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖ standard is ―narrow, and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.‖  State Farm, 
463 U.S. at 43.  Nevertheless, the agency must reach its 
decision by ―examin[ing] the relevant data,‖ and it must 
―articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
‗rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.‘‖  Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  We generally find agency 
action arbitrary and capricious where: 
 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress 
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.  The reviewing court should not 
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attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; 
we may not supply a reasoned basis for the 
agency‘s action that the agency itself has not 
given. 
Id. at 43 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947)). 
 
 Our review of the constitutional questions is more 
searching.  In cases raising First Amendment issues, we have 
―an obligation ‗to make an independent examination of the 
whole record‘ in order to make sure that ‗the judgment does 
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression.‘‖ United States v. Various Articles of Merch., 
Schedule No. 287, 230 F.3d 649, 652 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) 
(citations omitted)).   
 
III. 
 
 The FCC possesses authority to regulate indecent 
broadcast content, but it had long practiced restraint in 
exercising this authority.  During a span of nearly three 
decades, the Commission frequently declined to find 
broadcast programming indecent, its restraint punctuated only 
by a few occasions where programming contained indecent 
material so pervasive as to amount to ―shock treatment‖ for 
the audience.  Throughout this period, the Commission 
consistently explained that isolated or fleeting material did 
not fall within the scope of actionable indecency. 
 
 At the time the Halftime Show was broadcasted by 
CBS, the FCC‘s policy on fleeting material was still in effect.  
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The FCC contends its restrained policy applied only to 
fleeting utterances – specifically, fleeting expletives – and did 
not extend to fleeting images.  But a review of the 
Commission‘s enforcement history reveals that its policy on 
fleeting material was never so limited.  The FCC‘s present 
distinction between words and images for purposes of 
determining indecency represents a departure from its prior 
policy.  
 
 Like any agency, the FCC may change its policies 
without judicial second-guessing.  But it cannot change a 
well-established course of action without supplying notice of 
and a reasoned explanation for its policy departure.  Because 
the FCC failed to satisfy this requirement, we find its new 
policy arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act as applied to CBS.  
 
A. 
 
 Section 326 of the Communications Act prohibits the 
FCC from censoring its licensees‘ broadcasts.16  Subject to 
this constraint, the FCC retains authority to regulate obscene, 
indecent, or profane broadcast content.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
(―Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language 
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 See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (―Nothing in this chapter shall be 
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications or signals 
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission 
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of 
radio communication.‖). 
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by means of radio communication shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.‖).  
Indecency and obscenity are distinct categories of speech.  
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-41 (1978) 
(plurality opinion) (―Pacifica‖).  Indecency, unlike obscenity, 
is protected by the First Amendment.  Sable Commc‟ns of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).  The FCC‘s 
authority to restrict indecent broadcast content is nevertheless 
constitutionally permissible because of the unique nature of 
the broadcast medium.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51; see also 
id. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring).       
 
 Congress authorized the FCC to impose forfeiture 
penalties for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 in 1960.
17
  But 
the FCC did not exercise its authority to find a broadcast 
statutorily ―indecent‖ until 1975, when it issued a forfeiture 
penalty against Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting 
comedian George Carlin‘s ―Filthy Words‖ monologue.  See 
In re Citizen‟s Complaint Against Pacifica Found., Station 
WBAI(FM), N.Y., N.Y., 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).  Carlin‘s 
monologue, which Pacifica aired on the radio in an early-
afternoon time slot, contained extensive and repetitive use of 
several vulgar expletives over a period of twelve minutes.  
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739. 
 
 Pacifica appealed the FCC‘s forfeiture order to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The 
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 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (―Any person who is 
determined by the Commission . . . to have . . . violated any 
provision of section . . . 1464 of title 18 . . . shall be liable to 
the United States for a forfeiture penalty.‖).   
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FCC issued a clarification order while Pacifica‘s appeal was 
pending, expressly limiting its prior forfeiture order to the 
specific facts of the Carlin monologue.  In re „A Petition for 
Clarification or Reconsideration‟ of a Citizen‟s Complaint 
Against Pacifica Found., Station WBAI(FM), N.Y., N.Y., 59 
F.C.C.2d 892 (1976) (―Pacifica Clarification Order‖).  
Expressly acknowledging the forfeiture order‘s potential 
negative impact on broadcast coverage of live events where 
―there is no opportunity for journalistic editing,‖ the FCC 
stated its intention to exclude such circumstances from the 
scope of actionable indecency.  Id. at ¶ 4 n.1.   
 
 Following the Pacifica Clarification Order, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the FCC‘s forfeiture order against Pacifica as 
vague and overbroad and found the agency‘s indecency 
regime constituted invalid censorship under 47 U.S.C. § 326.  
Pacifica Found.  v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
The FCC appealed and the Supreme Court reversed in a 
narrow plurality opinion.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.  The 
Court rejected Pacifica‘s statutory argument that the term 
―indecent‖ in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 only covered obscene speech.  
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.  But the Court confirmed the 
general validity of the FCC‘s indecency regime, 
―emphasiz[ing] the narrowness of [its] holding,‖ which it 
confined to the facts of the Carlin monologue.  Id. at 750.  
Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, 
writing separately in part to reiterate the narrowness of the 
decision and to note the Court‘s holding did not ―speak to 
cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive 
word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from 
the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here.‖  
Id. at 760-61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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 Shortly after the Court‘s ruling in Pacifica, a 
broadcaster‘s license renewal was challenged on the basis that 
the broadcaster had aired indecent programming.  See In re 
Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 
(1978) (―WGBH‖).  Viewer complaints alleged the 
broadcaster aired several programs containing nudity and 
other allegedly offensive material.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Distinguishing 
the facts of WGBH from the Court‘s ruling in Pacifica, the 
FCC rejected the challenge and denied that Pacifica afforded 
it any ―general prerogative to intervene in any case where 
words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast 
over a licensed radio or television station.‖  Id. at ¶ 10.  The 
FCC, noting it ―intend[ed] strictly to observe the narrowness 
of the Pacifica holding‖ and emphasizing the language in 
Justice Powell‘s concurring opinion, id. at ¶ 10, concluded the 
single use of an expletive in a program ―should not call for us 
to act under the holding of Pacifica.‖  Id. at ¶ 10 n.6. 
 
 The FCC‘s restrained enforcement policy continued in 
the years following Pacifica.  Rejecting another challenge to 
a broadcaster‘s license renewal based on the airing of 
allegedly indecent material, the FCC reaffirmed that isolated 
use of expletives in broadcasts did not constitute actionable 
indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  See In re Application of 
Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983).   The complaint 
alleged the broadcaster had on multiple occasions aired 
programming containing language such as ―motherfucker,‖ 
―fuck,‖ and ―shit.‖  Id. at ¶ 16.  The FCC held these facts did 
not constitute a prima facie showing of actionable indecency 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, because the complainant had failed 
to show the broadcasts amounted to ―verbal shock treatment‖ 
as opposed to ―isolated use.‖  Id. at ¶ 18. 
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 In April 1987, the FCC issued three simultaneous 
indecency decisions.  See In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 
F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 
F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 
2705 (1987).  These decisions reaffirmed the Commission‘s 
restrained enforcement policy and reiterated the agency‘s 
policy that isolated or fleeting material would not be 
considered actionably indecent.  See, e.g., Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. at ¶ 3 (―Speech that is indecent must involve 
more than an isolated use of an offensive word.‖).   
 
 Later in 1987, reconsidering these decisions, the 
Commission abandoned the view that only the particular 
―dirty words‖ used in the Carlin monologue could be 
indecent.
18
  Instead, the FCC explained it would thereafter 
rely on the broader terms of its generic indecency standard, 
which defined indecent material as ―language that describes, 
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs, when there is a reasonable risk 
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 See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, ¶ 5 
(1987), vacated in part on other grounds, Action for 
Children‟s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (―ACT I‖), superseded by Action for Children‟s 
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(―ACT II‖). 
42 
 
that children may be in the audience.‖  Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5.19  Even 
so, the FCC affirmed all three decisions on reconsideration, 
never indicating disagreement with those decisions‘ express 
statements that isolated or fleeting material could not be 
actionably indecent.  Id. 
 
 In 2001, the broadcast industry sought clarification of 
the policies and rules of the FCC‘s indecency enforcement 
regime.  Guidance for the industry came in the form of a 
policy statement issued by the Commission.  See Industry 
Guidance on the Commission‟s Case Law Interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding 
Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, ¶ 19 (2001) 
(―Industry Guidance‖).  The policy statement included 
multiple examples of FCC rulings as ―case comparisons‖ 
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 As described in greater detail infra, subsequent litigation 
determined what time of day broadcasters could reasonably 
air indecent programming without expecting children to be in 
the audience.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a 
total ban on indecency, instructing the FCC to identify a 
precise time period during which broadcasters could air 
indecent material.  See ACT I, supra.  In response, the 
Commission adopted the safe-harbor rule of 47 C.F.R. § 
73.3999.  After further instruction from the D.C. Circuit in 
1995, ACT II, supra, the Rule was amended to its current 
form, which confines enforcement of indecency restrictions to 
the hours ―between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.‖  See 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.3999; In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against 
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 10 F.C.C.R. 10558 
(1995). 
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highlighting the factors that had proved significant in prior 
indecency determinations.  One of the factors noted as 
leading to prior determinations that a program was not 
actionably indecent was the ―fleeting or isolated‖ nature of 
potentially indecent material in the context of the overall 
broadcast.  See id. at ¶¶ 17-18.   
 
 Soon after the Commission‘s issuance of the Industry 
Guidance policy statement, its restrained enforcement policy 
changed.  In an unscripted remark during a live NBC 
broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards on January 19, 2003, 
musician Bono said ―this is really, really fucking brilliant‖ 
while accepting an award.  See In re Complaints Against 
Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, ¶ 3 n.4 
(2004) (―Golden Globes‖).  Viewers complained to the FCC 
about Bono‘s speech, but the Commission‘s Enforcement 
Bureau rejected the complaints in part because the utterance 
was fleeting and isolated and therefore did ―not fall within the 
scope of the Commission‘s indecency prohibition.‖  See In re 
Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding 
Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 
F.C.C.R. 19859, ¶ 6 (FCC Enforcement Bureau 2003).  The 
Enforcement Bureau specifically reaffirmed that ―fleeting and 
isolated remarks of this nature do not warrant Commission 
action.‖  Id. 
 
 On March 3, 2004, the full Commission reversed the 
Enforcement Bureau‘s decision.  See generally Golden 
Globes, supra.  Although the FCC acknowledged the 
existence of its restrained enforcement policy for isolated or 
fleeting utterances, it overruled all of its prior cases holding 
such instances not actionable.  Id. at ¶ 12 (―While prior 
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Commission and staff action have indicated that isolated or 
fleeting broadcasts of the ‗F-Word‘ such as that here are not 
indecent or would not be acted upon, consistent with our 
decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no 
longer good law.‖).  But the Commission made it clear that 
licensees could not be held liable for broadcasting fleeting or 
isolated indecent material prior to its Golden Globes decision.  
See id. at ¶ 15 & n.40 (declining to impose a forfeiture 
penalty because ―existing precedent would have permitted 
[the Golden Globe Awards] broadcast‖ and therefore it would 
be ―inappropriate‖ to sanction licensees for conduct prior to 
notice of policy change).
20
 
 
 The FCC‘s new indecency policy created in Golden 
Globes was soon challenged by the broadcast industry.  On 
February 21, 2006, the Commission issued an omnibus order 
resolving multiple indecency complaints against television 
broadcasters in an effort to ―provide substantial guidance to 
broadcasters and the public about the types of programming 
that are impermissible under our indecency standard.‖  In re 
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcats Between 
February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, ¶ 2 
(2006) (―Omnibus Order‖).  The Omnibus Order found four 
                                              
20
 The Commission also cited Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. 
FCC, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 2000), explaining that the court 
in Trinity ―reversed [a] Commission decision that denied a 
renewal application for abuse of process in connection with 
the Commission‘s minority ownership rules because the court 
found the Commission had not provided sufficiently clear 
notice of what those rules required.‖  Golden Globes at ¶ 15 
n.40. 
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programs indecent and profane: (1) Fox‘s broadcast of the 
2002 Billboard Music Awards, in which performer Cher used 
an unscripted expletive during her acceptance speech; (2) 
Fox‘s broadcast of the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, in 
which presenter Nicole Richie used two unscripted 
expletives; (3) ABC‘s broadcast of various episodes of its 
NYPD Blue series, in which assorted characters used scripted 
expletives; and (4) a CBS broadcast of The Early Show, in 
which a guest used an unscripted expletive during a live 
interview.  Id. at ¶¶ 101, 112 n.64, 125, 137.   Applying its 
policy announced in Golden Globes, the Commission found 
the broadcasts indecent despite the fleeting and isolated 
nature of the offending expletives.  Id. at ¶¶ 104, 116, 129, 
140.    
 
 As in Golden Globes, the Commission recognized the 
inequity in retroactively sanctioning the conduct of broadcast 
licensees.  Because the offending broadcasts occurred prior to 
the issuance of its Golden Globes decision, the FCC 
concluded that existing precedent would have permitted the 
broadcasts.  Id.  Accordingly, the FCC did not issue forfeiture 
orders against any of the licensees.  Id. at ¶¶ 111, 124, 136, 
145.   
 
 The networks appealed the Omnibus Order, and the 
cases were consolidated before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Granting a request by the 
FCC, the court remanded the matter to allow the Commission 
an opportunity to address the petitioners‘ arguments.  After 
soliciting public comment, the FCC issued a new order on 
November 6, 2006, reaffirming its indecency findings against 
Fox for the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards but 
reversing its finding against CBS for The Early Show 
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broadcast and dismissing the complaint against ABC on 
procedural grounds.  See In re Complaints Regarding Various 
Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 
8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) (―Fox Remand Order‖).   
 
 The networks‘ original appeal to the Second Circuit 
was reinstated on November 8, 2006, and consolidated with a 
petition for review of the Fox Remand Order.  Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(―Fox‖), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Mar. 17, 
2008) (No. 07-582).  The court granted motions to intervene 
by other networks, including CBS, and the networks 
collectively raised several challenges to the validity of the 
Fox Remand Order essentially mirroring those raised in this 
case.  See Fox, 489 F.3d at 454.   
 
 Undertaking a thorough review of the history of the 
FCC‘s indecency regime similar to that which we engage in 
here, the Second Circuit found the FCC‘s ―consistent 
enforcement policy‖ prior to the Golden Globes decision 
excluded fleeting or isolated expletives from regulation.  Id. 
at 455.  The court concluded ―there is no question‖ that the 
FCC changed its policy with respect to fleeting expletives, 
and that the policy ―changed with the issuance of Golden 
Globes.‖  Id. (citations omitted).  Judge Leval, dissenting in 
Fox for other reasons, agreed with the majority‘s conclusion 
that the FCC changed its position on fleeting utterances, 
although he considered the change of standard ―relatively 
modest.‖  See id. at 469 (Leval, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
470 (Leval, J., dissenting) (stating that the FCC changed its 
position and finding that the FCC clearly acknowledges that 
its Golden Globes and Fox Remand Order rulings were not 
consistent with its prior standard).  We agree that the Golden 
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Globes decision represented a policy departure by the FCC.  
The extensive history detailed above demonstrates a 
consistent and entrenched policy of excluding fleeting 
broadcast material from the scope of actionable indecency.   
 
 In spite of this history, the FCC contends that by 
February 1, 2004 (the date of the Halftime Show), a 
broadcaster in CBS‘s position should have known that even 
isolated or fleeting indecent material in programming could 
be actionable.  Despite its announced reversal of prior policy 
in its Golden Globes decision on March 3, 2004, the 
Commission points to one sentence in its 2001 policy 
statement to support its position: ―[E]ven relatively fleeting 
references may be found indecent where other factors 
contribute to a finding of patent offensiveness.‖  Industry 
Guidance at ¶ 19.
21
  But when read in its original context 
                                              
21
 In its 2001 policy statement, the Commission described 
the ―principal factors that have proved significant in [its] 
decisions to date‖ as: ―(1) the explicitness or graphic nature 
of the description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs 
or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at 
length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been 
presented for its shock value.‖  Industry Guidance at ¶ 10 
(emphasis in original).  It has since contended that its fleeting 
material policy was no policy at all, asserting instead that the 
fleeting nature of material was only a consideration under the 
second factor and could be outweighed by the other two 
factors depending on the specific facts of a case.  But as we 
detail infra, this assertion contradicts the history of the 
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rather than as an isolated statement, this sentence does not 
support the Commission‘s assertion here.  The ―relatively 
fleeting references‖ identified by that sentence are 
distinguishable from the truly ―fleeting‖ broadcast material 
the FCC had included in its fleeting material policy.  The 
paragraph cites, for instance, a notice of apparent liability 
against WEZB-FM, New Orleans, to exemplify the kind of 
―relatively fleeting references‖ the FCC considered 
actionably indecent.  See id. (citing EZ New Orleans, Inc. 
(WEZB(FM)), 12 F.C.C.R. 4147 (MMB 1997) (―WEZB-FM 
NAL‖)).  The citation to WEZB-FM NAL specifically 
describes as indecent an ―announcer joke‖ involving incest, 
forceful sexual contact with children, and a reference to 
cleaning ―blood off [a] diaper.‖  Id.  The ―announcer joke‖ is 
distinguishable on its face from ―fleeting‖ material such as a 
brief glimpse of nudity or isolated use of an expletive.  
Moreover, the ―announcer joke‖ was merely one incident 
                                                                                                     
Commission‘s indecency enforcement regime and is 
foreclosed by the agency‘s admissions in Golden Globes and 
Fox, which are controlling here, that its prior policy was to 
exclude fleeting material from the scope of actionable 
indecency.  Although the FCC disputes the breadth of its 
policy, now contending the policy was limited only to fleeting 
expletives or alternatively to fleeting utterances, the fleeting 
nature of broadcast material was unquestionably treated by 
the FCC as more than one of several contextual factors 
subject to balancing. 
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among dozens included in a transcript supporting the 
forfeiture liability determination in the WEZB-FM NAL.
22
   
 
 Nevertheless, as it clarified at oral argument, the FCC 
relies on its 2001 Industry Guidance to contend its policy on 
fleeting or isolated material ―was a policy with respect to 
cases relying solely on the use of expletives.‖  As the 
Commission explained at oral argument, ―[t]here was not a 
policy that all short utterances were exempt.‖  This reading of 
the Commission‘s policy on fleeting material is untenable.  
Even the FCC‘s Industry Guidance fails to support such a 
narrow characterization.  See, e.g., Industry Guidance at ¶ 18 
(quoting L.M. Commc‟ns of S. C., Inc. (WYBB(FM)), 7 
F.C.C.R. 1595 (MMB 1992), for the proposition that ―‗a 
fleeting or isolated utterance . . . , within the context of live 
and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a 
Commission sanction.‘‖). 
 
 Accordingly, we find the Commission‘s 
unsubstantiated contentions in this regard contradict the 
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 The WEZB-FM NAL found a broadcast licensee 
apparently liable for a forfeiture penalty of $12,000 for its 
broadcast of indecent material during six radio broadcasts 
spanning fourteen hours of airtime over nearly a one year 
period.  The WEZB-FM NAL  provides transcript excerpts 
from these broadcasts, which involved very graphic segments 
discussing a variety of sexual topics in extended detail.  The 
―announcer joke‖ included in the FCC‘s Industry Guidance 
was merely one of these factual predicates for the broadcast 
licensee‘s forfeiture liability for indecency. 
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lengthy history of the Commission‘s restrained enforcement 
policy.  While ―an agency‘s interpretation of its own 
precedent is entitled to deference,‖ Cassel v. FCC, 154 F.3d 
478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998), deference is inappropriate where 
the agency‘s proffered interpretation is capricious.  Until its 
Golden Globes decision in March of 2004, the FCC‘s policy 
was to exempt fleeting or isolated material from the scope of 
actionable indecency.  Because CBS broadcasted the 
Halftime Show prior to Golden Globes, this was the policy in 
effect when the incident with Jackson and Timberlake 
occurred. 
 
B. 
 
 If the FCC‘s restrained enforcement policy for fleeting 
broadcast material was intact until the Golden Globes 
decision in March of 2004, our inquiry would end with a 
simple examination of the chronology of the FCC‘s actions.  
CBS broadcasted the Halftime Show more than a month prior 
to Golden Globes.  The Commission‘s orders here would 
amount to a retroactive application of the new policy it 
announced in Golden Globes, which would raise due process 
concerns.  The Commission has recognized the inequity in 
such an outcome.  See Omnibus Order, supra, at ¶¶ 111, 124, 
136, 145 (declining to issue forfeiture orders because the 
offending broadcasts occurred prior to the issuance of its 
Golden Globes decision, and therefore ―existing precedent 
would have permitted [the] broadcasts‖); see also Trinity 
Broad. of Fla., Inc., 211 F.3d at 628 (―Because ‗[d]ue process 
requires that parties receive fair notice before being deprived 
of property,‘ we have repeatedly held that ‗[i]n the absence of 
notice–for example, where the regulation is not sufficiently 
clear to warn a party about what is expected of it–an agency 
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may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or 
criminal liability.‘‖ (citation omitted)). 
 
 But the FCC urges another reading of Golden Globes, 
perhaps less obvious yet still plausible, which interprets 
Golden Globes as addressing only the broadcast of fleeting 
expletives, not other fleeting material such as brief images of 
nudity.  Further, the Commission contends its fleeting 
material policy, as initially adopted, was limited to fleeting 
words and did not extend to fleeting images.  Under this view, 
Golden Globes would be inapposite here – the Commission‘s 
sanction against CBS would be in line with its treatment of 
images as part of its historical indecency enforcement regime.  
If, as the FCC contends, Golden Globes was limited to 
fleeting expletives, then its orders issuing forfeiture penalties 
in this case did not constitute a retroactive application of the 
policy change in Golden Globes.   
 
 But even if we accept the FCC‘s interpretation of 
Golden Globes and read it as only addressing fleeting 
expletives, the Commission‘s view of the scope of its fleeting 
materials policy prior to Golden Globes is unsustainable.  As 
we will explain, the Commission – before Golden Globes – 
had not distinguished between categories of broadcast 
material such as images and words.  Accordingly, even if, as 
the FCC contends, Golden Globes only addressed expletives, 
it nevertheless represented the first time the Commission 
distinguished between formats of broadcast material or 
singled out any one category of material for special treatment 
under its fleeting material policy.  That is, it altered the scope 
of the FCC‘s fleeting material policy by excising only one 
category of fleeting material – fleeting expletives – from the 
policy.  And it therefore did not constitute an abdication of its 
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fleeting material policy.  Rather, a residual policy on other 
categories of fleeting material – including all broadcast 
content other than expletives – remained in effect. 
 
 Accordingly, subsequent agency action was required to 
change the fleeting material policy as it applied to broadcast 
content other than expletives.  By targeting another category 
of fleeting material – fleeting images – in its orders against 
CBS in this case, the FCC apparently sought to further narrow 
or eliminate the fleeting material policy as it existed 
following Golden Globes.  The Commission‘s determination 
that CBS‘s broadcast of a nine-sixteenths of one second 
glimpse of a bare female breast was actionably indecent 
evidenced the agency‘s departure from its prior policy.  Its 
orders constituted the announcement of a policy change – that 
fleeting images would no longer be excluded from the scope 
of actionable indecency. 
 
 The question is whether the FCC‘s departure from its 
prior policy is valid and enforceable as applied to CBS.  As 
noted, agencies are free to change their rules and policies 
without judicial second-guessing.  See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 
(1984).  But an agency cannot ignore a substantial diversion 
from its prior policies.  See Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 
1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (agency must ―provide a 
reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards 
are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored‖).  As 
the Supreme Court explained in State Farm, an agency must 
be afforded great latitude to change its policies, but it must 
justify its actions by articulating a reasoned analysis behind 
the change: 
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Petitioner . . . contend[s] that the rescission of 
an agency rule should be judged by the same 
standard a court would use to judge an agency‘s 
refusal to promulgate a rule in the first place–a 
standard Petitioner believes considerably 
narrower than the traditional arbitrary and 
capricious test and ―close to the borderline of 
nonreviewability.‖  We reject this view. . . . 
Petitioner‘s view would render meaningless 
Congress‘ authorization for judicial review of 
orders revoking . . . rules.  Moreover, the 
revocation of an extant regulation is 
substantially different than a failure to act.  
Revocation constitutes a reversal of the 
agency‘s former views as to the proper course.  
A ―settled course of behavior embodies the 
agency‘s informed judgment that, by pursuing 
that course, it will carry out the policies 
committed to it by Congress.  There is, then, at 
least a presumption that those policies will be 
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.‖  
Accordingly, ―an agency changing its course by 
rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a 
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that 
which may be required when an agency does 
not act in the first instance.‖ 
463 U.S. at 42-43 (citations omitted).   
 
 The agency‘s obligation to supply a reasoned analysis 
for a policy departure requires an affirmative showing on 
record.  It ―must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‗rational 
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connection between the facts found and the choice made.‘‖ 
Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  A reviewing court ―must 
‗consider whether the decision was based on a consideration 
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.‘‖  Id. (citations omitted).  The agency‘s 
actions will then be set aside as ―arbitrary and capricious‖ if 
the agency failed to provide a ―reasoned explanation‖ for its 
decision to change course.  Massachusetts v. EPA, — U.S. —
, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007); see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 
42-43; Nat‟l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‟n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (―unexplained 
inconsistency‖ in agency practice is a reason for holding a 
policy reversal ―arbitrary and capricious‖ under the APA, 
unless ―the agency adequately explains the reasons for a 
reversal of policy‖).   
 
 In Fox, the Second Circuit analyzed the FCC‘s 
changed policy on fleeting expletives under State Farm,
23
 but 
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 It was undisputed that the FCC changed its policy on 
fleeting expletives in Golden Globes, which was decided 
prior to Fox.  But as the Fox court explained, the actual 
moment the agency changed its course was not pertinent in 
determining whether the change was valid under State Farm: 
 
[W]e . . . reject the FCC‘s contention that our 
review here is narrowly confined to the specific 
question of whether the two Fox broadcasts . . . 
were indecent.  The [Fox Remand Order] 
applies the policy announced in Golden Globes.  
If that policy is invalid, then we cannot sustain 
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the panel split on the outcome of its analysis.  Judge Pooler, 
writing for the majority, found the policy change arbitrary 
and capricious because the FCC failed to provide a reasoned 
explanation for the change.  Fox, 489 F.3d at 455 (―The 
Networks contend that the Remand Order is arbitrary and 
capricious because the FCC has made a 180-degree turn 
regarding its treatment of ‗fleeting expletives‘ without 
providing a reasoned explanation justifying the about-face.  
We agree.‖).  Scrutinizing the sufficiency of the 
Commission‘s explanation for its policy change, the court 
rejected the agency‘s proffered rationale as ―disconnected 
from the actual policy implemented by the Commission.‖  Id. 
at 459 n.8 (citation omitted). 
 
 Judge Leval, writing in dissent, also applied State 
Farm, but he disagreed with the amount of deference the 
majority afforded the FCC‘s policy decision.  Although he 
                                                                                                     
the indecency findings against Fox.  Thus, as 
the Commission conceded during oral 
argument, the validity of the new ―fleeting 
expletive‖ policy announced in Golden Globes 
and applied in the [Fox Remand Order] is a 
question properly before us on this petition for 
review. 
 
Fox, 489 F.3d at 454.  To hold otherwise would create a 
situation ripe for manipulation by an agency.  Cf. ACT I, 
supra, 852 F.2d at 1337 (―[A]n agency may not resort to [ad 
hoc] adjudication as a means of insulating a generic standard 
from judicial review.‖). 
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agreed that the FCC was obligated to provide a reasoned 
explanation for its policy shift, he found the agency‘s 
explanation sufficient.  As Judge Leval explained: 
 
In my view, in changing its position on the 
repetition of an expletive, the Commission 
complied with these requirements.  It made 
clear acknowledgment that its Golden Globes 
and Remand Order rulings were not consistent 
with its prior standard regarding lack of 
repetition.  It announced the adoption of a new 
standard.  And it furnished a reasoned 
explanation for the change.  Although one can 
reasonably disagree with the Commission‘s new 
position, its explanation . . . is not irrational, 
arbitrary, or capricious.  The Commission thus 
satisfied the standards of the Administrative 
Procedure[] Act. 
Id. at 470 (Leval, J., dissenting).  
 
 In this case, State Farm also provides the correct 
standard of review, but we need not engage in the substantive 
inquiry that divided the Second Circuit panel in Fox.  There, 
as Judge Leval noted in dissent, the FCC provided an 
explanation for changing its policy on fleeting expletives.  
The critical question splitting the court was whether that 
explanation was adequate under State Farm.  Here, unlike in 
Fox, the FCC has not offered any explanation – reasoned or 
otherwise – for changing its policy on fleeting images.  
Rather, the FCC asserts it never had a policy of excluding 
fleeting images from the scope of actionable indecency, and 
therefore no policy change occurred when it determined that 
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the Halftime Show‘s fleeting image of Janet Jackson‘s breast 
was actionably indecent.  Accordingly, we must determine 
whether the FCC‘s characterization of its policy history is 
accurate.  If it is not, then the FCC‘s policy change must be 
set aside as arbitrary and capricious, because it has failed to 
even acknowledge its departure from its former policy let 
alone supply a ―reasoned explanation‖ for the change as 
required by State Farm. 
 
 CBS contends the FCC‘s indecency regime treated 
words and images alike, so the exception for fleeting material 
applied with equal force to words and images.  The 
Commission rejects this assertion, contending its prior policy 
on fleeting material was limited to words alone.  Although the 
FCC acknowledges it had never explicitly distinguished 
between images and words for the purpose of defining the 
scope of actionable indecency, it contends the existence of 
such a distinction was obvious, even if unstated.
24
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 The FCC‘s position is difficult to reconcile with the 
source of its authority to regulate broadcast content.  The text 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides: ―Whoever utters any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  
Although the text on its face only reaches spoken words, it is 
applied broadly, as here, to reach all varieties of indecent 
content.  But this broad interpretation of the text requires that 
the FCC treat words and images interchangeably in order to 
fit its regulation of indecent images within the boundaries of 
its statutory authority.  Where the FCC‘s entire enforcement 
regime is built on the agency‘s treatment of words and images 
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 The Commission‘s conclusion on the nature and scope 
of its indecency regime – including its fleeting material policy 
– is at odds with the history of its actions in regulating 
indecent broadcasts.  In the nearly three decades between the 
Supreme Court‘s ruling in Pacifica and CBS‘s broadcast of 
the Halftime Show, the FCC had never varied its approach to 
indecency regulation based on the format of broadcasted 
content.  Instead, the FCC consistently applied identical 
standards and engaged in identical analyses when reviewing 
complaints of potential indecency whether the complaints 
were based on words or images.     
 
 In 2000, for example, the FCC rejected a complaint of 
indecency based on scenes of nudity in a television broadcast 
of the film ―Schindler‘s List.‖  In re WPBN/WTOM License 
Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838 (2000).  Finding the 
broadcasted images not actionably indecent, the FCC noted 
―nudity itself is not per se indecent‖ and applied the identical 
indecency test the agency used to review potentially indecent 
language.  Id. at ¶ 11.  The Commission did not treat the 
nudity complaint differently – factually or legally – from a 
complaint for indecency based on a spoken utterance.  See id. 
at ¶ 10 n.5 (―The Supreme Court has observed that contextual 
assessments may involve (and are not limited to) an 
                                                                                                     
as functionally identical, it is unclear how the difference 
between words and images is ―obvious.‖  At minimum, the 
FCC cannot reasonably expect the difference between words 
and images to be so self-evident that broadcast licensees 
seeking to comply with indecency standards would interpret 
FCC enforcement orders narrowly based on whether the 
reviewed content consisted of words or images. 
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examination of whether the actual words or depictions in 
context are, for example, vulgar or shocking, a review of the 
manner in which the words or depictions are portrayed, and 
an analysis of whether the allegedly indecent material is 
isolated or fleeting.‖ (emphasis added)).  The Commission 
even referred in a footnote to its policy towards fleeting 
material, never suggesting the policy would be inapplicable 
because the offending broadcast content was an image rather 
than a word.  See id. at ¶ 5 n.10 (explaining that contextual 
assessments of whether certain programming is patently 
offensive, and therefore actionably indecent, ―may involve . . 
. analysis of whether the allegedly indecent material is 
isolated or fleeting‖). 
 
 The Commission took the same approach when 
reviewing viewer complaints against a television station for 
multiple broadcasts of programs containing expletives, 
nudity, and other allegedly indecent material.  See WGBH, 
supra.
25
  Categorically denying that the programming in 
                                              
25
 Among several broadcasts at issue in WGBH were: (1) 
―numerous episodes of Monty Python‟s Flying Circus, which 
allegedly consistently relie[d] primarily on scatology, 
immodesty, vulgarity, nudity, profanity and sacrilege for 
humor‖; (2) ―a program entitled Rock Follies . . . which [the 
petitioner] describe[d] as vulgar and as containing profanity‖ 
including ―obscenities such as shit, bullshit, etc., and action 
indicating some sexually-oriented content in the program‖; 
and (3) ―other programs which allegedly contained nudity 
and/or sexually-oriented material.‖  69 F.C.C.R. 1250 at ¶ 2 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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WGBH was actionably indecent,
26
 the FCC distinguished the 
facts of WGBH from the Carlin monologue in Pacifica by 
invoking its restrained enforcement policy for fleeting or 
isolated material.  See id. at ¶ 10 (―We intend strictly to 
observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding. . . . Justice 
Powell‘s concurring opinion . . . specifically distinguished 
‗the verbal shock treatment [in Pacifica]‘ from ‗the isolated 
use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio 
broadcast.‘ . . . In the case before us, petitioner has made no 
comparable showing of abuse by WGBH-TV of its 
programming discretion.‖); id. at ¶ 10 n.6 (finding that 
WGBH-TV‘s programs ―differ[ed] dramatically from the 
concentrated and repeated assault involved in Pacifica‖).   In 
its indecency analysis in WGBH, the FCC made no distinction 
between words and images (nudity or otherwise). 
 
 As evidence that the FCC‘s policy on fleeting material, 
as it existed at the time of the Halftime Show, did not 
                                              
26
 The FCC contends WGBH is inapposite because it was a 
license revocation proceeding rather than a direct complaint 
for indecency.  But its analysis in reaching its decision is 
instructive.  Because the complainant in WGBH challenged 
the broadcaster‘s license based on a pattern of allegedly 
indecent broadcasts, the Commission expressly answered the 
threshold question of whether the broadcasts were indecent.  
Separate from the question of whether the broadcaster‘s 
actions were sufficient to revoke its license, the 
Commission‘s analysis illustrates that ―words‖ and 
―depictions‖ were treated identically for purposes of 
determining whether a broadcast was actionably indecent. 
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distinguish between words and images, CBS presented 
several complaints viewers had submitted to the FCC about 
allegedly indecent broadcasts.  CBS Letter Br., submitted 
pursuant to Fed R. App. P. 28(j) (Aug. 13, 2007).  
Accompanying each complaint is a corresponding reply letter 
by the FCC rejecting the indecency allegation.  Each 
complaint involves some variety of sexually explicit imagery.  
One letter, for example, describes the early-evening broadcast 
of a female adult dancer at a strip club and alleges the 
broadcast contained visible scenes of the woman nude from 
the waist down revealing exposed buttocks and ―complete 
genital nudity‖ for approximately five to seven seconds.  
Another letter describes in part a Sunday-morning television 
broadcast of the movie ―Devices and Desires,‖ which 
included ―scenes of a topless woman in bed with her lover, 
with her breast very clearly exposed, several scenes of a 
topless woman running on the beach, and several scenes of a 
nude female corpse, with the breasts clearly exposed.‖ 
 
 Citing Pacifica and the indecency standard used to 
review the broadcast of potentially indecent language, the 
FCC summarily rejected each of these complaints as ―not 
actionably indecent.‖  The FCC contends these ―form letters‖ 
are irrelevant, as the letters ―do not even explain the grounds 
for the staff‘s conclusions that the broadcasts were not 
indecent, much less rely on the ‗fleeting‘ nature of any 
alleged nudity as a reason for rejecting the complaints.‖  FCC 
Letter Br., submitted pursuant to Fed R. App. P. 28(j) (Aug. 
27, 2007).  But the relevance of the FCC‘s rejection letters is 
not found in their specific reasons for finding the images not 
actionably indecent.  Rather, the rejection letters illustrate that 
the FCC used the identical form letters and indecency 
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analyses to address complaints of indecent nudity that it had 
long used to address complaints of indecent language. 
 
 Confronted with this history of FCC enforcement of 
restrictions on broadcast indecency, the entirety of which 
reveals no distinction in treatment of potentially indecent 
images versus words, the FCC nevertheless finds such a 
distinction evident in its prior decisions.  See, e.g., FCC Br. at 
26-27.  To support this view, the FCC offers its Notice of 
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture in In re Young Broadcasting 
of San Francisco, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 1751 (2004), issued four 
days before CBS‘s broadcast of the Halftime Show.  See 
Reconsideration Order at ¶¶ 10, 36; FCC Br. at 26-27.  Young 
Broadcasting involved a morning news show segment in 
which two performers from a production titled ―Puppetry of 
the Penis‖ appeared in capes but were otherwise naked 
underneath the capes.  Young Broadcasting at ¶ 13.  The two 
men, whose act involved manipulating and stretching their 
genitalia to simulate various objects, performed a 
demonstration of their act with the agreement of the show‘s 
hosts and at the urging of off-camera station personnel.  Id.  
Although the performance was directed away from the 
camera, the penis of one performer was fully exposed on 
camera for less than one second as the men turned away to act 
out their performance.  See id. at ¶¶ 12, 13.  Based on these 
facts, the Commission found the station apparently liable for 
a forfeiture penalty for broadcasting indecent material.  Id. at 
¶ 16. 
 
 The FCC contends Young Broadcasting was not a 
departure from its prior indecency regime.  Rather, as it 
explains, Young Broadcasting merely represented the first 
instance in which the Commission expressly articulated its 
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pre-existing (but unstated) policy of treating fleeting images 
differently from fleeting words.
27
  On this view, according to 
the FCC, Young Broadcasting should have dispelled any 
doubts about the historical breadth of its fleeting material 
policy prior to the Halftime Show because it was issued a few 
days before CBS‘s broadcast.  But Young Broadcasting is 
unavailing for this purpose.  It makes no distinction, express 
or implied, between words and images in reaching its 
indecency determination.  To the contrary, it discusses and 
compares several other FCC determinations on potentially 
indecent utterances and depictions, treating the cases 
interchangeably and ultimately distinguishing those cases‘ 
outcomes without any indication that the format of the 
                                              
27
 Several statements in the FCC‘s own press release 
announcing the Young Broadcasting Notice of Apparent 
Liability belie the agency‘s contention here that Young 
Broadcasting accorded with its prior policies.  See Press 
Release, FCC, Comm‟n Proposes to Fine Young 
Broadcasting of San Francisco, Inc., Statutory Maximum for 
Apparent Violation of Indecency Rules (Jan. 27, 2004) 
(statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell: ―Today, we open 
another front in our increased efforts to curb indecency on our 
nation‘s airwaves . . . .‖); id. (statement of Commissioner 
Michael J. Copps: ―I am pleased that this Commission is 
finally taking an initial step against indecency on 
television.‖); id. (statement of Commissioner Kevin J. Martin: 
―I hope that this step today represents the beginning of a 
commitment to consider each indecency complaint seriously . 
. . .‖).  
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offending material was a relevant consideration.  See, e.g., id. 
at ¶ 12 & n.35; id. at ¶ 14.
28
 
 
 Accordingly, Young Broadcasting does not support the 
FCC‘s assertion here that its policy on fleeting material had 
always excluded images and applied only to words.    Young 
Broadcasting appears instead to be best understood as the 
                                              
28
 One of the cases the FCC distinguished in Young 
Broadcasting was its Notice of Apparent Liability in Flambo 
Broadcasting, Inc. (KFMH-FM), 9 F.C.C.R. 1681 (MMB 
1994), which involved ―a radio station‘s broadcast of sexual 
material in a crude joke‖ that was not found actionably 
indecent.  Young Broadcasting at ¶ 12 n.35.  As with the other 
cases it discussed in its Young Broadcasting Notice of 
Apparent Liability, the FCC did not draw any distinction 
between Young Broadcasting and Flambo Broadcasting 
based on the subject material there being words or images.  
But it did distinguish the two notices of apparent liability in 
part because: ―assuming that the joke [at issue in Flambo 
Broadcasting] was cut off immediately, the staff of the then-
Mass Media Bureau found that it would not have been 
actionably indecent because it was brief, live, unscripted and 
from an outside source.‖  Young Broadcasting at ¶ 12 n.35 
(emphasis added).  Notably, the facts here – a brief image of a 
bare female breast during the live Halftime Show broadcast 
resulting from an unscripted stunt by Jackson and Timberlake 
– are remarkably similar to the Flambo Broadcasting fact 
pattern that the FCC found readily distinguishable from the 
actionably indecent material in Young Broadcasting. 
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Commission‘s initial effort to abandon its restrained 
enforcement policy on fleeting material.  While the final 
disposition of Young Broadcasting was still unresolved,
29
 the 
overarching policy departure that the Commission sought to 
accomplish there was effectuated by a combination of its 
Golden Globes order and its orders on appeal here.   The 
Commission‘s reasoning in Young Broadcasting is therefore 
illuminating here.  
                                              
29
 Young Broadcasting was a notice of apparent liability, 
which is non-final until the implicated licensee either declines 
to dispute the findings in the notice or the licensee‘s 
responsive opposition is fully adjudicated.  See FCC Br. at 13 
(describing content of CBS Notice of Apparent Liability as 
―tentative conclusions‖); see also 47 U.S.C. § 504(c) (―In any 
case where the Commission issues a notice of apparent 
liability looking toward the imposition of a forfeiture under 
this chapter, that fact shall not be used, in any other 
proceeding before the Commission, to the prejudice of the 
person to whom such notice was issued, unless (i) the 
forfeiture has been paid, or (ii) a court of competent 
jurisdiction has ordered payment of such forfeiture, and such 
order has become final.‖).  At the time the Commission 
issued its Reconsideration Order against CBS and after its 
determination in Golden Globes, the question of whether the 
broadcast licensee in Young Broadcasting would contest the 
Notice of Apparent Liability in that case was still unresolved.  
See Reconsideration Order at ¶ 6 n. 25 (indicating the status 
of the Young Broadcasting Notice of Apparent Liability as 
―response pending‖ at the time of the Reconsideration 
Order‘s issuance).   
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 In Young Broadcasting, the Commission distinguished 
that case‘s facts from several of its prior orders.  But in so 
doing, the Commission overlooked the fact that application of 
its fleeting material policy had been a determinative factor in 
those prior orders.  For example, the licensee in Young 
Broadcasting cited for support L.M. Communications, 7 
F.C.C.R. 1595 (1992), in which the radio broadcast of a 
single expletive was found not actionably indecent.  Young 
Broadcasting at ¶ 12 n.35.  The FCC found L.M. 
Communications ―distinguishable because there was no 
finding that the material, in context, was pandering, titillating 
or intended to shock the audience.‖  Id.  But L.M. 
Communications made no reference to the pandering, 
titillating or shocking nature of the subject broadcast material.  
Rather, it determined the material was not actionably indecent 
because the ―broadcast contained only a fleeting and isolated 
utterance which, within the context of live and spontaneous 
programming, does not warrant a Commission sanction.‖  
L.M. Commc‟ns, 7 F.C.C.R. at 1595. 
 
 The Commission‘s failure to acknowledge the 
existence of its prior policy on fleeting material in Young 
Broadcasting is illustrative of its approach here.  In Young 
Broadcasting, it read the policy out of existence by 
substituting new rationales for its prior indecency 
determinations that had applied the policy.  Here, the 
Commission is foreclosed from adopting the same approach 
by its admission in Golden Globes that the fleeting material 
policy existed.  So it instead apparently seeks to revise the 
scope of the policy by contending the policy never included 
fleeting images.  But extensive precedent over thirty years of 
indecency enforcement demonstrates otherwise.   
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 Our reluctant conclusion that the FCC has advanced 
strained arguments to avoid the implications of its own 
fleeting indecency policy was echoed by our sister circuit in 
Fox: 
 
In [its Omnibus Order], the FCC ―reject[s] 
Fox‘s suggestion that Nicole Richie‘s [use of 
two expletives] would not have been actionably 
indecent prior to our Golden Globes decision,‖ 
and would only concede that it was ―not 
apparent‖ that Cher‘s [use of one expletive] at 
the 2002 Billboard Music Awards would have 
been actionably indecent at the time it was 
broadcast.  [Id.] at ¶¶ 22, 60.  Decisions 
expressly overruled in Golden Globes were now 
dismissed as ―staff letters and dicta,‖ and the 
Commission even implied that the issue of 
fleeting expletives was one of first impression 
for the FCC in Golden Globes.  Id. at ¶ 21 (―[I]n 
2004, the Commission itself considered for the 
first time in an enforcement action whether a 
single use of an expletive could be considered 
indecent.‖). 
Fox, 489 F.3d at 456 n.6.  When confronted with these 
troublesome revisionist arguments, the FCC conceded the 
existence of its prior policy.  See id. at 456 (―[I]n its brief to 
this court, the FCC now concedes that Golden Globes 
changed the landscape with regard to fleeting expletives.‖ 
(citations omitted)); see also id. at 470 (Leval, J., dissenting) 
(―[The FCC] made clear acknowledgment that its Golden 
Globes and Remand Order rulings were not consistent with 
its prior standard regarding lack of repetition.‖).  But it has 
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made no such concession here.  Faced with extensive 
evidence to the contrary, the Commission nevertheless 
continues to assert that its fleeting material policy was limited 
to words and did not exclude fleeting images from the scope 
of actionable indecency. 
 
 In sum, the balance of the evidence weighs heavily 
against the FCC‘s contention that its restrained enforcement 
policy for fleeting material extended only to fleeting words 
and not to fleeting images.  As detailed, the Commission‘s 
entire regulatory scheme treated broadcasted images and 
words interchangeably for purposes of determining 
indecency.  Therefore, it follows that the Commission‘s 
exception for fleeting material under that regulatory scheme 
likewise treated images and words alike.   Three decades of 
FCC action support this conclusion.  Accordingly, we find the 
FCC‘s conclusion on this issue, even as an interpretation of 
its own policies and precedent, ―counter to the evidence 
before the agency‖ and ―so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.‖  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  
 
 Because the Commission fails to acknowledge that it 
has changed its policy on fleeting material, it is unable to 
comply with the requirement under State Farm that an agency 
supply a reasoned explanation for its departure from prior 
policy.19  See id.; cf. Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1125 
                                              
19 In its brief and at oral argument, the Commission 
continues to assert it has not changed its policy on fleeting 
material, yet it also suggests several reasons why a policy 
including fleeting images within the scope of actionable 
indecency is reasonable.  But see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50 
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(―[F]ailure to come to grips with conflicting precedent 
constitutes an [agency‘s] inexcusable departure from the 
essential requirement of reasoned decision making.‖); 
LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Roberts, J.) (―[W]here, as here, a party makes a 
significant showing that analogous cases have been decided 
differently, the agency must do more than simply ignore that 
argument. . . . The need for an explanation is particularly 
acute when an agency is applying a multi-factor test through 
case-by-case adjudication.‖).  Consequently, the FCC‘s new 
policy of including fleeting images within the scope of 
actionable indecency is arbitrary and capricious under State 
Farm and the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore 
invalid as applied to CBS. 
 
IV. 
 
In finding CBS liable for a forfeiture penalty, the FCC 
arbitrarily and capriciously departed from its prior policy 
excepting fleeting broadcast material from the scope of 
actionable indecency.  Therefore, we will grant CBS‘s 
petition for review and will vacate the Commission‘s order in 
its entirety.  
 
                                                                                                     
(―[T]he courts may not accept appellate counsel‘s post hoc 
rationalizations for agency action.  It is well-established that 
an agency‘s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself.‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
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CBS v. FCC, No. 06-3575 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, Dissenting 
 This case comes to us on remand from the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  CBS petitions for review of 
orders by the Federal Communications Commission imposing 
a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for the 
broadcast of ―indecent‖ material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999.  I believe the Supreme Court‘s 
intervening opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), undermines the basis of our prior 
holding on the Administrative Procedure Act.
1
  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent and would hold the FCC‘s imposition of 
a civil forfeiture here is neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
Furthermore, I would hold precedent requires we remand to 
the FCC for it to apply the proper standard for ordering a civil 
forfeiture for the broadcast of indecent material. 
The alleged indecency occurred during the Halftime 
Show of Super Bowl XXXVIII, broadcast live by CBS on 
February 1, 2004.  The Show‘s finale involved a routine by 
Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake.  In an unscripted 
moment at the end of the performance, Timberlake tore away 
part of Jackson‘s bustier, exposing her bare right breast to the 
camera.  The image was broadcast over public airwaves for 
nine-sixteenths of one second.   
 At issue is the responsibility of television broadcasters 
for the transmission of unscripted ―indecent‖ material during 
                                                          
1
 My colleagues incorporate portions of our earlier decision in 
Part B of their opinion.  Since I believe Fox requires a 
different result, I would omit our prior opinion. 
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live, contemporaneous television shows.  Broadcast television 
(as opposed to transmissions over cable, satellite, or internet) 
is subject to greater oversight because the finite number of 
broadcast frequencies are allocated among competing 
applicants.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
376 (1969) (―Without government control, the medium would 
be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, 
none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.‖); cf. 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (―[O]f all 
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received 
the most limited First Amendment protection.‖).  The 
―scarcity doctrine‖—the idea that limited broadcast spectrum 
and practical factors make television broadcasting unique 
among media—―has required some adjustment in First 
Amendment analysis.‖  FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 
U.S. 364, 376-77 (1984).
2
   
                                                          
2
 CBS and others have questioned whether broadcasting 
continues to be a unique medium.  The Court, however, has 
so far declined to abandon the scarcity doctrine without the 
support of Congress or the FCC.  See League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n.11 (―The prevailing rationale for 
broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has come 
under increasing criticism . . . .  We are not prepared, 
however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without 
some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological 
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the 
system of broadcast regulation may be required.‖); see also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-8, FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011)  (No. 10-1293), 2011 
WL 1540430 at *2-8 (providing the Solicitor General‘s view 
on the development of indecency policy and the unique 
position of broadcast television).  
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In our earlier decision, we invalidated the FCC‘s 
determination that CBS‘s broadcast of a fleeting image of 
nudity was actionably indecent.  Examining the history of the 
FCC‘s enforcement of the indecency standard, we concluded 
the FCC‘s policy had been to treat unscripted fleeting 
material as per se exempt from regulation.  Because we 
believed the FCC‘s forfeiture orders against CBS constituted 
an unacknowledged change in policy, we held they violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act‘s (APA) prohibition on 
arbitrary and capricious agency action.  See 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A).  Furthermore, even assuming the fleeting image of 
nudity was actionably indecent, we concluded CBS could not 
be held liable for the broadcast unless it acted with scienter, 
and it was unclear whether the FCC had applied the proper 
standard.  Accordingly, we vacated the FCC‘s orders and 
remanded to allow the FCC an opportunity to reconsider its 
indecency standard and the mens rea for broadcaster liability. 
 The FCC filed a petition for certiorari.  While that 
petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).  The 
question presented in Fox was whether the FCC had violated 
the APA in issuing orders holding Fox liable for isolated 
expletives broadcast during the 2002 and 2003 Billboard 
Music Awards.  The Court held the FCC had adequately 
explained its decision such that its orders were neither 
arbitrary nor capricious under the APA.  Soon after deciding 
Fox, the Court granted the FCC‘s petition for certiorari in this 
case, vacated our judgment, and remanded for us to 
reconsider the case in light of Fox.  FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. 
Ct. 2176 (2009). 
 In Fox, unlike here, the FCC acknowledged it was 
departing from precedent.  Nevertheless, I believe the Court‘s 
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intervening decision in Fox requires us to revise our prior 
APA holding.  Based on the Supreme Court‘s account of the 
history of the FCC‘s enforcement policy, we cannot adhere to 
our earlier determination that prior FCC policy had granted a 
per se exemption to all fleeting indecent material; instead, 
Fox compels the conclusion that the fleeting exemption was 
limited to a particular type of words.  Accordingly, under 
Fox, I cannot say the orders in this case represented a change 
in agency policy, and I would hold the FCC‘s indecency 
finding passes muster under the APA.  The FCC, however, 
cannot impose a forfeiture penalty unless CBS acted with the 
requisite scienter.  Because I believe the FCC‘s forfeiture 
orders rested on the wrong statutory provision, and 
misapprehended the proper mens rea standard, I would vacate 
the orders and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
A. 
 Our previous opinion set forth the relevant facts: 
 On February 1, 2004, CBS presented a 
live broadcast of the national Football League‘s 
Super Bowl XXXVIII, which included a 
halftime show produced by MTV Networks.  
Nearly 90 million viewers watched the Halftime 
Show, which began at 8:30 p.m. Eastern 
Standard Time and lasted about fifteen minutes.  
The Halftime Show featured a variety of 
musical performances by contemporary 
recording artists, with Janet Jackson as the 
announced headlining act and Justin Timberlake 
as a ―surprise guest‖ for the final minutes of the 
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show. 
 Timberlake was unveiled on stage near 
the conclusion of the Halftime Show.  He and 
Jackson performed his popular song ―Rock 
Your Body‖ as the show‘s finale.  Their 
performance, which the FCC contends involved 
sexually suggestive choreography, portrayed 
Timberlake seeking to dance with Jackson, and 
Jackson alternating between accepting and 
rejecting his advances.  The performance ended 
with Timberlake singing, ―gonna have you 
naked by the end of this song,‖ and 
simultaneously tearing away part of Jackson‘s 
bustier.  CBS had implemented a five-second 
audio delay to guard against the possibility of 
indecent language being transmitted on air, but 
it did not employ similar precautionary 
technology for video images.  As a result, 
Jackson‘s bare right breast was exposed on 
camera for nine-sixteenths of one second. 
 
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(footnote omitted). 
 After fielding a large number of complaints from 
viewers of the Halftime Show, the FCC issued a letter of 
inquiry to CBS seeking additional information about the 
broadcast.  CBS complied.  It also made ―a public statement 
of apology for the incident,‖ stating that ―Jackson and 
Timberlake‘s wardrobe stunt was unscripted and 
unauthorized‖ and ―claiming it had no advance notice of any 
plan by the performers to deviate from the script.‖  Id. at 172. 
 On September 22, 2004, the FCC issued a Notice of 
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Apparent Liability finding that CBS had apparently violated 
federal law and FCC rules regulating the broadcast of 
indecency and was apparently liable for a forfeiture penalty of 
$550,000.  CBS submitted its Opposition to the Notice.   
 On March 15, 2006, the FCC issued a forfeiture order 
and imposed a penalty of $550,000.  In re Complaints Against 
Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004 
Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, 21 FCC 
Rcd. 2760 (2006) (―Forfeiture Order‖).  Applying the 
standard set forth in its 2001 policy statement, the FCC found 
the Halftime Show incident satisfied the two-part test for 
indecency:  (1) ―the material must describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities,‖ and (2) it must be ―patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium.‖  In re Industry Guidance on the 
Comm‟n‟s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC 
Rcd. 7999, 8002, ¶¶ 7–8 (2001) (―Industry Guidance‖); see 
Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC. Rcd. at 2764–65, ¶ 9.  Finding the 
―broadcast of an exposed female breast‖ met the first part of 
the test, the FCC focused most of its analysis on whether the 
broadcast was ―patently offensive.‖  Forfeiture Order, 21 
FCC Rcd. at 2764–67, ¶¶ 9–14. 
 The FCC‘s 2001 policy statement had explained that in 
determining whether broadcast material is patently offensive, 
―the full context in which the material appeared is critically 
important.‖  Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8002, ¶ 9.  
Three factors are of principal significance:  ―(1) the 
explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction 
of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the 
material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual 
or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material 
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appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the 
material appears to have been presented for its shock value.‖  
Id. at 8003, ¶ 10 (emphasis removed).  According to the 
policy statement, ―[n]o single factor generally provides the 
basis for an indecency finding‖; the three factors ―must be 
balanced‖ to determine whether a given broadcast is patently 
offensive.  Id. 
 Applying these factors in its Forfeiture Order, the 
FCC determined that, ―in context and on balance,‖ the 
Halftime Show material was ―patently offensive.‖  21 FCC 
Rcd. at 2765, ¶ 10.  The FCC conceded the second factor 
weighed against a finding of indecency because ―the image of 
Jackson‘s uncovered breast . . . is fleeting.‖  Id. at 2766, ¶ 12.  
It noted, however, that ―‗even relatively fleeting references 
may be found indecent where other factors contribute to a 
finding of patent offensiveness,‘‖ and concluded ―[i]n this 
case, . . . the brevity of the partial nudity is outweighed by the 
first and third factors of our contextual analysis.‖  Id. (quoting 
Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8009, ¶ 19).  In the FCC‘s 
view, the image was ―graphic and explicit‖ because ―although 
the camera shot is not a close-up, the nudity is readily 
discernible[,] . . . Jackson and Timberlake, as the headline 
performers, are in the center of the screen, and Timberlake‘s 
hand motion ripping off Jackson‘s bustier draws the viewer‘s 
attention to her exposed breast.‖  Id. at 2765, ¶ 11.  The FCC 
also believed, taken in context, the material appeared to 
shock, pander to, or titillate the audience:  
The offensive segment in question did not 
merely show a fleeting glimpse of a woman‘s 
breast . . . .  Rather, it showed a man tearing off 
a portion of a woman‘s clothing to reveal her 
naked breast during a highly sexualized 
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performance and while he sang ―gonna have 
you naked by the end of this song.‖ 
Id. at 2767, ¶ 13.  On the strength of these two factors, the 
FCC found the image actionably indecent. 
 The Forfeiture Order also found that CBS was liable 
under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) for Timberlake and Jackson‘s 
performance.  CBS claimed ―it had no advance knowledge 
that Timberlake planned to tear off part of Jackson‘s clothing 
to reveal her breast.‖  Id. at 2768, ¶ 17.  The FCC did not 
dispute this contention, but it nonetheless determined CBS 
was subject to a monetary forfeiture.  Id. at 2769-74, ¶¶ 18–
25. 
 CBS submitted a Petition for Reconsideration 
challenging several aspects of the FCC‘s analysis.  In an 
Order on Reconsideration filed on May 31, 2006, the FCC 
reaffirmed the $550,000 forfeiture.  In re Complaints Against 
Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004 
Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, 21 FCC 
Rcd. 6653 (2006) (―Reconsideration Order‖).  The Order 
rejected CBS‘s constitutional arguments and reiterated the 
FCC‘s indecency finding.  The Reconsideration Order 
revised the FCC‘s approach for determining CBS‘s liability 
under § 503(b)(1).  According to the Order, there were three 
independent bases for CBS‘s liability.  First, despite the fact 
the network ―was acutely aware of the risk of unscripted 
indecent material in [the Halftime Show],‖ it ―consciously 
and deliberately failed to take reasonable precautions to 
ensure that no actionably indecent material was broadcast.‖  
Reconsideration Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6660, ¶ 17; accord 
id. at 6662, ¶ 23 (stating that the FCC‘s ―finding of 
willfulness is based on CBS‘s knowledge of the risks and its 
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conscious and deliberate omissions of the acts necessary to 
address them‖).  Second, the FCC found Jackson and 
Timberlake performed as employees of CBS, not independent 
contractors.  Accordingly, CBS was vicariously liable for 
their actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Id. at 
6662-64, ¶¶ 24–28.  Third, even if Timberlake and Jackson 
were independent contractors, CBS would still be liable for 
their actions in the FCC‘s view because of ―the nondelegable 
nature of broadcast licensees‘ responsibility for their 
programming.‖  Id. at 6662, ¶ 23.  For these reasons, the FCC 
refused to rescind or reduce its forfeiture penalty. 
B. 
 CBS timely filed a petition for review of the 
Reconsideration Order on July 28, 2006.  In our previous 
opinion, we agreed with CBS that the order‘s indecency 
finding violated the APA.  CBS, 535 F.3d at 175.  We 
acknowledged that ―[t]he scope of review under the [APA‘s] 
‗arbitrary and capricious‘ standard is ‗narrow, and a court is 
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,‘‖ and that 
―[l]ike any agency, the FCC may change its policies without 
judicial second-guessing.‖  Id. at 174–75 (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‟n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  But we noted the FCC ―cannot change a 
well-established course of action without supplying notice of 
and a reasoned explanation for its policy departure.‖  Id. at 
175. 
 We concluded the FCC violated that principle here by 
failing to acknowledge or explain a departure from ―a 
consistent and entrenched policy of excluding fleeting 
broadcast material from the scope of actionable indecency.‖  
Id. at 179.  In our view, it was not until its Golden Globes 
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decision, issued more than a month after the Halftime Show, 
that the agency expressly ―overruled all of its prior cases 
holding [isolated or fleeting material] not actionable.‖  Id. at 
178; see In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees 
Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” 
Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4980, ¶ 12 (2004) (―Golden 
Globes‖) (―While prior Commission and staff action had 
indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‗F-Word‘ 
such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted upon, 
consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such 
interpretation is no longer good law.‖).  Before this date, we 
believed, ―the FCC‘s policy was to exempt fleeting or 
isolated material‖ from indecency regulation.  CBS, 535 F.3d 
at 180.  ―Because CBS broadcasted the Halftime Show prior 
to Golden Globes, this was the policy in effect when the 
incident with Jackson and Timberlake occurred.‖  Id.  
Accordingly, by finding the fleeting image here to be 
actionably indecent, the FCC‘s orders in this case broke with 
agency policy.  And since these orders failed to acknowledge 
the existence of that policy, we determined they were ―unable 
to comply with the [APA‘s] requirement . . . that an agency 
supply a reasoned explanation for its departure‖ from its prior 
policy.  Id. at 188. 
 As this account suggests, our construction of the 
FCC‘s enforcement history played a decisive role in our 
previous opinion.  That opinion recounted this history in 
detail, see id. at 175–89, but a synopsis is necessary here in 
order to make clear the significance of the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Fox.  The FCC‘s indecency policy had its genesis 
in 1975, when the FCC issued a forfeiture penalty against 
Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting comedian George 
11 
 
Carlin‘s ―Filthy Words‖ monologue.3  See In re Citizen‟s 
Complaint Against Pacifica Found., Station WBAI(FM), New 
York, N.Y., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94 (1975).  ―Carlin‘s monologue, 
which Pacifica aired in an early-afternoon time slot, contained 
extensive and repetitive use of several vulgar expletives over 
a period of twelve minutes.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 175 (citing 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739).  While Pacifica‘s appeal was 
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, the FCC ―issued a clarification order . . . 
expressly limiting its prior forfeiture order to the specific 
facts of the Carlin monologue.‖  Id. (citing In re a „Petition 
for Clarification or Reconsideration‟ of a Citizen‟s Complaint 
against Pacifica Found., Station WBAI(FM), New York, N.Y., 
59 F.C.C. 2d 892 (1976)).  The D.C. Circuit reversed the 
FCC‘s forfeiture order as vague and overbroad, Pacifica 
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but the 
Supreme Court upheld the agency‘s action in a narrow 
plurality opinion, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  The plurality 
―confirmed the general validity of the FCC‘s indecency 
regime‖ while at the same time ―‗emphasiz[ing] the 
narrowness of [its] holding,‘ which it confined to the facts of 
the Carlin monologue.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 176 (quoting 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750) (alterations in original).  Justices 
Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment and wrote 
separately to underscore ―the narrowness of the decision and 
to note the Court‘s holding did not ‗speak to cases involving 
the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course 
                                                          
3
 ―Congress authorized the FCC to impose forfeiture penalties 
for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 in 1960.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 
175; see Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. 
No. 86-752, § 7, 74 Stat. 889, 894 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)). 
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of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shock 
treatment administered by respondent here.‘‖  Id. (quoting 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring)).   
Our previous opinion found that the FCC adopted a 
―restrained enforcement policy . . . in the years following 
Pacifica.‖  Id.  In a 1978 opinion, the FCC rejected a 
challenge to ―several programs containing nudity and other 
allegedly offensive material.‖  Id.; see In re Application of 
WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C. 2d 1250 (1978) (―WGBH‖).  
The agency, noting it ―‗intend[ed] strictly to observe the 
narrowness of the Pacifica holding‘ and emphasizing the 
language in Justice Powell‘s concurring opinion, concluded 
the single use of an expletive in a program ‗should not call for 
us to act under the holding of Pacifica.‘‖ Id. (quoting WGBH, 
69 F.C.C. 2d at 1254, ¶ 10 n.6) (alteration in CBS).   
 In our view, three decisions issued in 1987 had 
―reaffirmed the Commission‘s restrained enforcement policy 
and reiterated the agency‘s policy that isolated or fleeting 
material would not be considered actionably indecent.‖  Id.  
We acknowledged that, in a subsequent order reconsidering 
these decisions, ―the Commission abandoned the view that 
only the particular ‗dirty words‘ used in the Carlin monologue 
could be indecent,‖ but we observed that the order on 
reconsideration ―never indicat[ed] disagreement with those 
decisions‘ express statements that isolated or fleeting material 
could not be actionably indecent.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 177; see 
In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987), vacated 
in part on other grounds, Action for Children‟s Television v. 
FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1988), superseded in 
part by Action for Children‟s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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  As noted, our earlier opinion concluded the Golden 
Globes opinion of March 3, 2004, was the first time the FCC 
indicated that fleeting material could be held indecent.  That 
case involved an unscripted remark during a live NBC 
broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards on January 19, 2003, 
in which ―musician Bono said ‗this is really, really f[* * *] 
brilliant‘ while accepting an award.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 177; 
see Golden Globes, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4976, ¶ 3 n.4.  The FCC 
held the broadcast actionable, but it declined to impose a 
forfeiture penalty because ―existing precedent would have 
permitted th[e] broadcast.‖  See Golden Globes, 19 FCC Rcd. 
at 4981-82, ¶ 15 n.40 (citing Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. 
FCC, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  We believed Golden 
Globes itself ―made it clear that licensees could not be held 
liable for broadcasting fleeting or isolated indecent material 
prior to its Golden Globes decision.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 178. 
 On February 21, 2006, the FCC issued an omnibus 
order resolving multiple indecency complaints against 
television broadcasters.  See In re Complaints Regarding 
Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 
2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006).  The Order found four 
programs, all of which involved the use of expletives,
4
 to be 
                                                          
4
 The four programs were: ―(1) Fox‘s broadcast of the 2002 
Billboard Music Awards, in which performer Cher used an 
unscripted expletive during her acceptance speech; (2) Fox‘s 
broadcast of the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, in which 
presenter Nicole Richie used two unscripted expletives; (3) 
ABC‘s broadcast of various episodes of its NYPD Blue 
series, in which assorted characters used scripted expletives; 
and (4) a CBS broadcast of The Early Show, in which a guest 
used an unscripted expletive during a live interview.‖  CBS, 
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indecent.  But ―[b]ecause the offending broadcasts occurred 
prior to the issuance of its Golden Globes decision, the FCC 
concluded that existing precedent would have permitted the 
broadcasts.  Accordingly, the FCC did not issue forfeiture 
orders against any of the licensees.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 178 
(internal citations removed).   
 The networks nonetheless appealed the Order, which, 
as revised,
5
 was invalidated in a 2-1 decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  See Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), 
rev‟d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).  Our earlier opinion explicitly 
refrained from engaging the issue that split the Second Circuit 
panel, see CBS, 535 F.3d at 182–83; we focused instead on 
that court‘s unanimous finding that the FCC‘s enforcement 
policy ―prior to the Golden Globes decision [had consistently] 
excluded fleeting or isolated expletives from regulation,‖ id. 
at 179 (citing Fox, 489 F.3d at 455).  That conclusion, we 
believed, confirmed our view that until Golden Globes, the 
FCC‘s policy ―was to exclude fleeting material from the 
scope of actionable indecency.‖  Id. at 179 n.10. 
 The FCC did not categorically deny that its policy had 
                                                                                                                                  
535 F.3d at 178 (citing Various Television Broads., 21 FCC 
Rcd. at ¶¶ 101, 112 n.64, 125, 137). 
5
  See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. 
Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 
(2006).  The revised order reversed the finding that The Early 
Show broadcast was indecent and dismissed the complaint 
against ABC on procedural grounds.  Id. at 13299, ¶ 1.  The 
order reviewed by the Second Circuit (and subsequently by 
the Supreme Court) thus contained indecency determinations 
only as to the two Billboard Music Awards broadcasts. 
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exempted fleeting content from regulation.  But it 
contended—and continues to contend—that the exemption 
had been limited to fleeting expletives and had never applied 
to fleeting images such as the one at issue here.  According to 
the FCC, the Golden Globes opinion simply eliminated the 
exceptional treatment of fleeting expletives and subjected all 
broadcast content to the same contextual, multi-factor test, in 
which the material‘s fleeting nature is but one consideration 
to be weighed in the balance.  Our previous opinion rejected 
this interpretation.  We concluded that, on the contrary, ―[i]n 
the nearly three decades between the Supreme Court‘s ruling 
in Pacifica and CBS‘s broadcast of the Halftime Show, the 
FCC had never varied its approach to indecency regulation 
based on the format of broadcasted content.‖  Id. at 184; see 
id. at 181 (―[T]he Commission—before Golden Globes—had 
not distinguished between categories of broadcast material 
such as images and words.‖); see also id. at 180 (―Until its 
Golden Globes decision . . . the FCC‘s policy was to exempt 
fleeting or isolated material from the scope of actionable 
indecency.‖ (emphasis added)).  In our view, fleeting images, 
like all other fleeting content, were immune from regulation 
under the pre-Golden Globes regime.  Accordingly, we 
believed that if the FCC were right that ―Golden Globes only 
addressed expletives, . . . a residual [per se exemption] policy 
on other categories of fleeting material—including all 
broadcast content other than expletives—remained in effect,‖ 
and that ―subsequent agency action was required to change 
the fleeting material policy as it applied‖ to these remaining 
categories.  Id. at 181. 
 The FCC had insisted that ―any doubts about the 
historical breadth of its fleeting material policy prior to the 
Halftime Show‖ should have been ―dispelled‖ by the FCC‘s 
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decision in In re Young Broadcasting of San Francisco, Inc., 
19 FCC Rcd. 1751 (2004), issued a few days before CBS‘s 
Super Bowl broadcast.  CBS, 535 F.3d at 186.  There, the 
FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture to: 
a morning news show segment in which two 
performers from a production titled ―Puppetry 
of the Penis‖ appeared in capes but were 
otherwise naked underneath the capes.  The two 
men, whose act involved manipulating and 
stretching their genitalia to simulate various 
objects, performed a demonstration of their act 
with the agreement of the show‘s hosts and at 
the urging of off-camera station personnel.  
Although the performance was directed away 
from the camera, the penis of one performer 
was fully exposed on camera for less than one 
second as the men turned away to act out their 
performance. 
Id. (citing Young Broad., 19 FCC Rcd. at 1755-56, ¶¶ 12, 13).  
The FCC conceded that the offending image was ―fleeting‖ 
but concluded it was nonetheless indecent given its explicit 
and pandering qualities.  Young Broad., 19 FCC Rcd. at 
1755-57, ¶¶ 11–14.  In the FCC‘s view, Young Broadcasting 
should have made clear to CBS that the fleetingness of an 
offending image would not necessarily immunize the 
broadcaster from liability. 
 Our previous opinion found this argument 
unconvincing.  We believed the FCC‘s action in Young 
Broadcasting was hobbled by the same flaw that afflicted the 
forfeiture orders against CBS:  it ―fail[ed] to acknowledge the 
existence of [the FCC‘s] prior policy on fleeting material,‖ 
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instead ―read[ing] the policy [of exempting fleeting material] 
out of existence by substituting new rationales for its prior 
indecency determinations that had applied the policy.‖  CBS, 
535 F.3d at 187.  Because Young Broadcasting was, we 
believed, an invalid ―initial effort to abandon [the FCC‘s] 
restrained enforcement policy on fleeting material,‖ id., that 
policy remained in effect at the time of the Halftime Show.  
And since the forfeiture orders against CBS similarly 
―fail[ed] to acknowledge‖ a change in FCC policy ―on 
fleeting material,‖ they were ―unable to comply with the 
requirement . . . that an agency supply a reasoned explanation 
for its departure from prior policy.‖  Id. at 188 (citing State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).  In sum, Young Broadcasting did not 
alter our conclusion that the FCC‘s orders violated the APA. 
 This violation of the APA was not the only flaw we 
identified in the FCC‘s orders.  Even assuming the FCC‘s 
indecency finding had been valid, we would have found ―the 
Commission [had] incorrectly determined CBS‘s liability for 
Jackson and Timberlake‘s Halftime Show performance.‖  Id. 
at 189.  Two of the FCC‘s three arguments for liability were 
untenable.  First, the agency ―contend[ed] the performers‘ 
intent c[ould] be imputed to CBS under the common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior.‖  Id.  We concluded, 
however, that ―Jackson and Timberlake were independent 
contractors, who are outside the scope of respondeat 
superior, rather than employees as the FCC found.‖  Id. at 
189–98.  Second, the FCC argued ―because broadcast 
licensees hold non-delegable duties to avoid the broadcast of 
indecent material and to operate in the public interest,‖ they 
are vicariously liable for the acts of even their independent 
contractors.  Id. at 198.  This proposition, we believed, could 
not be reconciled with the First Amendment.  ―[A]n unwitting 
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broadcaster might be held liable for its independent 
contractor‘s negligence in monitoring and maintaining a 
tower antenna without raising a constitutional question,‖ but 
―the same cannot be said of imposing liability for the speech 
or expression of independent contractors.‖  Id. at 199.  ―A 
broadcast licensee,‖ we explained, ―should not be found 
liable for violating the indecency provisions of [federal law] 
without proof the licensee acted with scienter.  Because the 
Commission‘s proffered ‗non-delegable duty‘ theory of 
CBS‘s vicarious liability, which functionally equates to strict 
liability for speech or expression of independent contractors, 
appears to dispense with this constitutional requirement,‖ we 
concluded it could ―not be sustained.‖  Id. at 203. 
 ―As an alternative to vicarious liability, the FCC found 
CBS directly liable for a forfeiture penalty . . . for failing to 
take adequate precautionary measures to prevent potential 
indecency during the Halftime Show.‖  Id.  According to the 
FCC, the touchstone under this theory was whether CBS had 
―acted willfully.‖  Reconsideration Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 
6655, ¶ 5.  The FCC did ―not dispute‖ that CBS ―neither 
planned Jackson and Timberlake‘s offensive actions nor knew 
of the performers‘ intent to incorporate those actions into 
their performance.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 189.  But the FCC 
believed CBS had satisfied the ―willfulness‖ requirement 
based on the agency‘s finding that ―CBS was acutely aware 
of the risk of unscripted indecent material‖ in the Halftime 
Show, but had nonetheless ―consciously and deliberately 
failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that no 
actionably indecent material was broadcast.‖  
Reconsideration Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6660, ¶ 17. 
 Without ruling on whether this third theory might 
ultimately sustain a finding of liability on the facts of this 
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case, we found certain key aspects of the FCC‘s reasoning 
―unclear.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 189.  First, we had doubts about 
whether the agency had ―properly applied the forfeiture 
statute.‖  Id. at 203; see 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1).  Under 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), the FCC has authority to order 
forfeiture penalties upon determining that a person ―willfully 
or repeatedly failed to comply with any of the provisions of 
this chapter or of any rule, regulation, or order issued by the 
Commission under this chapter.‖  Another statutory 
subsection, § 503(b)(1)(D), authorizes forfeitures for 
violations of several specific statutory provisions, including 
the indecency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1)(D).  Although the FCC‘s orders sometimes 
specifically invoked § 503(b)(1)(B), see, e.g., Forfeiture 
Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2778, ¶ 36, and its ―willfulness‖ 
standard appears to represent the agency‘s interpretation of 
that subsection‘s express mens rea element, the orders 
referred in other places to § 503(b) or § 503(b)(1) only 
generally, without specifying the applicable subsection, see, 
e.g., Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2760, ¶ 1 n.1; 
Reconsideration Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 6655, ¶ 5.  Given that 
§ 503(b)(1)(D) expressly authorizes forfeitures for indecency 
violations, we questioned ―whether the statutory scheme 
permits violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to be penalized by 
forfeitures issued under section 503(b)(1)(B) instead of, or in 
addition to, section 503(b)(1)(D).‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 205. 
 As noted, our previous opinion determined that ―a 
showing of scienter is constitutionally required to penalize 
broadcast indecency.‖  Id.  Although § 503(b)(1)(B) 
contained an express mens rea standard, i.e. willfulness, and 
§ 503(b)(1)(D) did not, we believed both provisions must be 
interpreted to ―set a bar‖ to liability ―at least as high as 
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scienter.‖  Id.  A key question, then, was what level of 
scienter was necessary to sustain a penalty for indecent 
expression.  ―Where a scienter element is read into statutory 
text,‖ we observed, ―scienter would not necessarily equate to 
a requirement of actual knowledge or specific intent.‖  Id. at 
206.  Instead, ―[t]he presumption in favor of scienter requires 
a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is 
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise 
innocent conduct.‖  Id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 
U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).  Applying this principle, we surmised 
that recklessness was a sufficiently culpable mental state for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  ―It is likely,‖ we explained, 
―that a recklessness standard would effectively separate 
wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct of 
broadcasters without creating an end-around indecency 
restrictions that might be encouraged by an actual knowledge 
or intent standard.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Moreover, we noted that recklessness had been 
found to be an adequate scienter standard in other contexts, 
including First Amendment contexts.  Id. at 206–07. 
 The parties here had disputed whether CBS took 
adequate precautions with regard to the risk of indecency in 
the Halftime Show.  The parties disagreed about whether 
certain events leading up to the broadcast—including public 
comments by Jackson‘s choreographer that the performance 
would include ―some shocking moments‖— indicated a high 
risk of indecent material.  Another point of contention 
involved the role of video delay technology.  Although CBS 
utilized a five-second audio delay, it did not delay its video 
broadcast.  We found ―[b]ecause the Commission carries the 
burden of showing scienter, it should have presented evidence 
to demonstrate, at a minimum, that CBS acted recklessly and 
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not merely negligently when it failed to implement a video 
delay mechanism for the Halftime Show broadcast.‖  Id. at 
208.  Because we found the ―record at present‖ was wanting 
in this regard, we were ―unable to decide whether the 
Commission‘s determination that CBS acted ‗willfully‘ was 
proper in light of the scienter [i.e., recklessness] 
requirement.‖  Id. 
 Having determined the FCC‘s enforcement actions 
here were arbitrary and capricious, our previous decision 
vacated the forfeiture orders and remanded.  Although we 
recognized the FCC could ―not retroactively penalize CBS‖ 
for material that was not indecent under FCC policy at the 
time of broadcast, we explained the agency could still enter a 
declaratory order on remand, ―set[ting] forth a new policy and 
proceed[ing] with its indecency determination even though a 
retroactive monetary forfeiture [would be] unavailable.‖  Id. 
at 209.  The remand also afforded the agency an opportunity 
to address the constitutionally required scienter element of the 
indecency standard. 
C. 
 While the FCC‘s petition for certiorari in this case was 
pending, the Supreme Court decided Fox.  As noted, Fox 
reviewed the Second Circuit‘s decision invalidating monetary 
forfeitures issued against Fox and its affiliates for several 
unscripted expletives broadcast live during two different 
Billboard Music Awards ceremonies.
6
  The FCC‘s forfeiture 
                                                          
6
 The first incident occurred during the 2002 Awards, ―when 
the singer Cher exclaimed, ‗I‘ve also had critics for the last 
40 years saying that I was on my way out every year.  Right.  
So f* * * ‗em.‘‖ Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1808.  The second took 
22 
 
orders for fleeting expletives in Fox, unlike its orders 
penalizing a fleeting image here, ―forthrightly acknowledged 
that [they were breaking] new ground.‖  Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 
1812.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit had found the 
agency‘s explanation for its policy change inadequate.  In 
reviewing this determination, the Supreme Court gave its own 
account of the FCC‘s enforcement history. 
 The Court‘s chronicle, like ours, began with Pacifica‘s 
sanction of George Carlin‘s ―Dirty Words‖ routine.  Id. at 
1806.  The Court explained that ―[i]n the ensuing years, the 
Commission took a cautious, but gradually expanding, 
approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition against 
indecent broadcasts.‖  Id.  Like our previous opinion, Fox 
noted the FCC decided in 1987 that its enforcement power 
was not limited to ―the seven words actually contained in the 
George Carlin monologue.‖  Id. at 1807 (quoting In re 
Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699, ¶ 12 (1987)).  
But the Court in Fox observed something in the 1987 
decisions that we had not mentioned:  it found the FCC 
opinions expanding the scope of the agency‘s enforcement 
also  
preserved a distinction between literal and 
nonliteral (or ‗expletive‘) uses of evocative 
language.  The Commission explained that each 
literal ―description or depiction of sexual or 
excretory functions must be examined in 
context to determine whether it is patently 
                                                                                                                                  
place during the 2003 Awards, when Nicole Richie 
―proceeded to ask the audience, ‗Why do they even call it 
‗The Simple Life‘?  Have you ever tried to get cow s* * * out 
of a Prada purse?  It‘s not so f* * *ing simple.‘‖ Id. 
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offensive,‖ but that ―deliberate and repetitive 
use . . . is a requisite to a finding of indecency‖ 
when a complaint focuses solely on the use of 
nonliteral expletives. 
Id. (quoting Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd. at 2699, ¶ 13) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 The Court in Fox found the Golden Globes decision 
was ―the first time‖ the FCC declared ―that a nonliteral 
(expletive) use of the F- and S-words could be actionably 
indecent, even when the word is used only once.‖  Id.  
Because the broadcasts at issue in Fox had occurred prior to 
the Golden Globes order, the FCC had ―declined to assess 
penalties.‖  Id. at 1812.  Accordingly, the indecency 
determinations in Fox did not pose a notice or due process 
problem, and the Court‘s majority opinion limited itself 
exclusively to the question of whether the FCC‘s explanation 
for holding fleeting or isolated expletives indecent—which 
largely echoed the justification proffered in Golden Globes—
passed muster under the APA. 
 The Court answered that question in the affirmative.  
The Court rejected the principle (espoused by the Second 
Circuit) that ―agency action that changes prior policy‖ 
requires ―a more substantial explanation‖ than does action in 
an area previously untouched.  Id. at 1810.  Although ―[a]n 
agency may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio or 
simply disregard rules that are still on the books . . . it need 
not demonstrate to a court‘s satisfaction that the reasons for 
the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.‖  
Id. at 1811.  Accordingly, the Court concluded an ―agency 
need not always provide a more detailed justification than 
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.‖  
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Id. 
 Judged under this clarified standard, the FCC orders at 
issue in Fox were not arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 1812–
19.  The FCC acknowledged its change in policy, and the 
Court found its reasons for including fleeting expletives 
within the scope of actionable indecency to be ―entirely 
rational.‖  Id. at 1812.  In making this determination, the 
Court compared the FCC‘s policy toward fleeting expletives 
with its treatment of other offensive material.  ―It was 
certainly reasonable,‖ the Court believed, for the agency ―to 
determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal 
and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive 
use to render only the latter indecent.‖  Id.  The per se 
exemption for fleeting expletives, the Court explained, had 
been an anomaly:  
When confronting other requests for per se 
rules governing its enforcement of the 
indecency prohibition, the Commission ha[d] 
declined to create safe harbors for particular 
types of broadcasts.  The Commission could 
rationally decide it needed to step away from its 
old regime where nonrepetitive use of an 
expletive was per se nonactionable because that 
was at odds with the Commission‘s overall 
enforcement policy. 
Id. at 1813 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Because ―[e]ven isolated utterances can be made in 
pand[ering,] . . . vulgar and shocking manners,‖ the Court 
found it rational for the FCC to cease providing ―a safe harbor 
for single words‖ and subject them instead to the agency‘s 
general ―context-based‖ test for ―patent offensiveness.‖  Id. at 
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1812–13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration 
and omission in original). 
II. 
 According to the FCC, Fox stands for the proposition 
that the safe harbor had extended only to isolated expletives, 
i.e. non-literal language, and not, as we had originally 
concluded, to all fleeting material.  The FCC points to Fox‘s 
statement that FCC policy historically subjected 
―description[s] or depiction[s]‖ of sexual organs or functions 
to a contextual standard, reserving a safe harbor only for 
―nonliteral expletives.‖  Id. at 1807 (quoting Pacifica Found., 
2 FCC Rcd. at 2699, ¶ 13).  Because images are ―depictions,‖ 
the FCC argues, Fox tells us that images were not entitled to a 
safe harbor. 
 CBS, by contrast, denies that anything in Fox 
undermines our previous conclusion that the FCC‘s forfeiture 
orders represented a change in policy.  ―Fox,‖ CBS argues, 
―does not involve allegedly indecent images, and focuses 
solely on words uttered.‖  CBS Letter-Brief 6 (Jan. 29, 2010).  
In CBS‘s view, Fox‘s discussion of the 1987 FCC opinion 
Pacifica Foundation is ―utterly irrelevant‖ to the issue before 
us.  Id. at 1.  In its view, Fox‘s identification of a distinction 
between the treatment of literal utterances and nonliteral 
expletives is merely background information incidental to the 
Supreme Court‘s holding and therefore dicta.  The FCC, on 
the other hand, argues the Court‘s description of the FCC‘s 
historic enforcement policy is integral to its holding that the 
FCC orders in Fox complied with the APA.     
I believe Fox‘s distinction between the FCC‘s historic 
treatment of different kinds of fleeting material undermines a 
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key premise of our earlier opinion.  Our opinion did not rest 
on an explicit statement by the FCC that fleeting images 
would be per se exempt from indecency regulation.  Instead, 
we identified FCC decisions that had held certain isolated 
words immune from the enforcement regime.  See, e.g., CBS, 
535 F.3d at 176 (quoting WGBH, 69 F.C.C. 2d at 1254, ¶ 10 
n.6).  In addition, after reviewing the entirety of the agency‘s 
enforcement history up until the Halftime Show, we found 
―the FCC had never varied its approach to indecency 
regulation based on the format of broadcasted content.‖  Id. at 
184.  Accordingly, we concluded the FCC‘s enforcement 
policy had contained a blanket rule exempting all fleeting 
material, without qualification, from the indecency standard. 
In Fox, however, the Supreme Court states that FCC 
policy did, in fact, make distinctions ―based on the format of 
broadcasted content.‖  As the Court interpreted the FCC‘s 
pre-Golden Globes enforcement history, ―literal 
‗description[s] or depiction[s] of sexual or excretory 
functions‘‖ were subject to a multi-factor test and could 
potentially be found indecent notwithstanding their fleeting or 
nonrepetitive character, Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807 (quoting 
Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd. at 2699, ¶ 13); the safe harbor 
for fleetingness encompassed only the ―use of nonliteral 
expletives,‖ id.  ―Although the Commission had expanded its 
enforcement beyond the ‗repetitive use of specific words or 
phrases,‘ it preserved a distinction between literal and 
nonliteral (or ‗expletive‘) uses of evocative language.‖  See 
id. at 1807.  Fox therefore contradicts and undermines our 
previous holding that FCC enforcement policy embodied a 
general exemption for all fleeting material.
7
  Moreover, Fox 
                                                          
7
 I acknowledge that the allegedly indecent material at issue 
in Fox involved only words, and that Fox‘s discussion of the 
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describes the narrow safe harbor for fleeting ―nonliteral 
expletives‖ or ―evocative language‖ as a deviation from the 
default rule of contextual analysis.  The per se exemption, 
Fox explains, was ―at odds with the Commission‘s overall 
enforcement policy.‖  Id. at 1813.  ―When confronting other 
requests for per se rules governing its enforcement of the 
indecency prohibition, the Commission ha[d] declined to 
create safe harbors for particular types of broadcasts.‖  Id.   
In other words, Fox identifies contextual analysis as 
the default policy for all broadcast content, with the narrow 
exception of nonliteral expletives.  Although my colleagues 
emphasize the omission of any specific discussion of images 
in Fox, our earlier opinion‘s finding of a safe harbor for 
fleeting images was premised on a per se exemption for 
fleeting content generally.  As Fox portrays the FCC‘s 
enforcement history, however, no such general policy existed.  
Instead, the Court concluded that the safe harbor for fleeting 
nonliteral expletives was an isolated exception rather than an 
instance of a more general rule.  It reasoned that the removal 
                                                                                                                                  
FCC enforcement policy is not on its face addressed to the 
agency‘s treatment of images.  But the Court‘s account of 
FCC enforcement policy and history limits the fleeting 
exemption solely to nonliteral use of ―evocative language.‖ 
See id. at 1807.  The Court noted that the FCC had rejected 
other types of exemptions.  See id. at 1813 (―When 
confronting other requests for per se rules governing its 
enforcement of the indecency prohibition, the Commission 
has declined to create safe harbors for particular types of 
broadcasts.‖).  The structure of the Court‘s discussion 
conveys that the Court viewed the exception for nonliteral 
expletive language as an exception at odds with the FCC‘s 
treatment of all other material, including images. 
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of this exception allowed the FCC to bring treatment of 
fleeting indecent language into harmony with its overall 
enforcement policy.  Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1813.  The existence 
of a similar safe harbor for fleeting images would have 
undermined this key holding of Fox.  The Court‘s omission of 
any discussion of fleeting images strongly suggests that, 
rather than constituting a per se exception, such instances fell 
within the contextual approach that the Court identified as the 
―Commission‘s prior enforcement practice.‖  Fox, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1814.    It follows that the FCC‘s decision to apply a 
contextual analysis to the fleeting image in this case did not 
represent a change in policy. 
The Court‘s holding expressly relied on the 
distinctions it identified in the FCC‘s historic treatment of 
different types of fleeting content.  In concluding the 
agency‘s reasons for eliminating a safe harbor for fleeting 
―nonliteral expletives‖ were ―entirely rational,‖ the Court 
explained that ―[i]t was certainly reasonable to determine that 
it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral 
uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to render 
only the latter indecent.‖  Id. at 1812.  The very fact that the 
safe harbor for fleeting expletives was an isolated exception 
to the FCC‘s general contextual standard was itself, the Court 
said, a defensible reason for the policy change announced in 
Golden Globes and Fox:   ―The Commission could rationally 
decide it needed to step away from its old regime where 
nonrepetitive use of an expletive was per se nonactionable 
because that was at odds with the Commission‘s overall 
enforcement policy.‖  Id. at 1813 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
As this examination of Fox makes clear, the Supreme 
Court‘s account of the FCC‘s pre-Golden Globes enforcement 
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policy is not characterization, but central to Fox‘s holding.    
Given that account, I would hold that the FCC‘s indecency 
determination in this case did not constitute a change of 
policy—unacknowledged or otherwise—and was not 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
8
   
                                                          
8
 Our previous opinion identified several FCC decisions in 
which the FCC had found that certain fleeting images did not 
violate the indecency standard.  See CBS, 535 F.3d at 184–86.  
We believed these decisions supported our conclusion that 
FCC policy had afforded a safe harbor to all fleeting material.  
In none of these cases, however, did the FCC state that 
fleeting images were per se nonactionable.  In light of Fox, I 
believe that these decisions are also compatible with a 
contextual standard.  Precisely because the reasoning in many 
of these opinions is sparse, they may be read as holding not 
that the fleeting quality of the images was per se dispositive 
but rather that, in the particular context presented, the image‘s 
transience outweighed any countervailing factors. 
 CBS argues that even if fleeting material did not enjoy 
a per se exemption under FCC policy, the agency applied its 
contextual standard differently here that it had in earlier cases 
where fleetingness proved dispositive.  ―[P]atently 
inconsistent applications of agency standards to similar 
situations are by definition arbitrary.‖  South Shore Hosp., 
Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2002).  But CBS 
has not shown that the facts in this case are materially 
indistinguishable from a case in which the agency found no 
indecency.  As we have recognized, ―an agency‘s 
interpretation of its own precedent is entitled to deference.‖  
CBS, 535 F.3d at 180 (quoting Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 
483 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  Given the nature of the FCC‘s 
contextual standard, each case is likely to present a unique 
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In our earlier opinion, we determined that if the policy 
change set forth in Golden Globes and Fox addressed only 
fleeting expletives, as the FCC has asserted, then it left in 
place a safe harbor for all other fleeting content.  CBS, 535 
F.3d at 181.  Fox held precisely the opposite—that in 
eliminating a safe harbor for fleeting expletives in Golden 
Globes and Fox, the FCC made a reasonable decision to 
abolish an anomalous exception and establish a uniform 
contextual test for all allegedly indecent material.  The 
rationale of the FCC decision suggested by our earlier 
opinion—to eliminate a safe harbor for presumptively less 
offensive fleeting expletives while maintaining a per se 
exemption for fleeting literal utterances and potentially 
graphic images—would appear more dubious.  In short, our 
earlier opinion is irreconcilable with the reasoning by which 
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC orders in Fox. 
  CBS argues that even if the indecency determination 
here did not constitute a change of policy, the forfeiture 
penalty must be invalidated because CBS was not sufficiently 
―on notice‖ of its potential liability for fleeting images.  
―Because due process requires that parties receive fair notice 
before being deprived of property. . . in the absence of 
notice—for example, where the regulation is not sufficiently 
clear to warn a party about what is expected of it—an agency 
may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or 
criminal liability.‖  Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 
                                                                                                                                  
balance of factors, and I cannot say that the FCC acted 
unreasonably in determining that the fleetingness of the 
image here was outweighed by its graphic and pandering 
qualities. 
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F.3d 618, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  Referring to the 1987 FCC decision 
quoted by Fox, CBS submits that ―no fine [in this case] can 
be justified based on a cryptic reference in dictum that was 
never discussed or applied for over two decades.‖ CBS 
Letter-Brief at 18. 
CBS‘s argument implicitly assumes that the 1987 
decision was the only indication by the FCC that fleeting 
images were potentially actionable.  But that is not the case.  
At the very least, the FCC‘s opinion in Young Broadcasting, 
which involved somewhat similar facts and was issued only 
days before the Halftime Show, made clear that fleeting 
images of nudity could be found indecent if presented in a 
sufficiently explicit and pandering fashion.  In issuing its 
Notice of Apparent Liability in that case, the FCC explained 
that ―although the actual exposure of the performer‘s penis 
was fleeting in that it occurred for less than a second,‖ this 
mitigating factor was outweighed by the explicitness and 
pandering quality of the image‘s presentation.  Young Broad., 
19 FCC Rcd. at 1754–55, ¶¶ 10–12; see also id. (―In 
particular cases, one or two of the factors may outweigh the 
others, either rendering the broadcast material patently 
offensive and consequently indecent, or, alternatively, 
removing the broadcast material from the realm of 
indecency.‖ (footnotes omitted)).9 
                                                          
9
 It is true, as we noted in our previous opinion, that Young 
Broadcasting ―makes no distinction, express or implied, 
between words and images.‖  CBS, 535 F.3d at 186.  The 
FCC‘s opinion suggests that all fleeting content is subject to a 
contextual standard and fails to acknowledge even the limited 
safe harbor for fleeting expletives identified in Fox.  See 
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In our earlier opinion, we acknowledged that Young 
Broadcasting found a nude image indecent despite its 
fleetingness, but we declined to give effect to the FCC‘s 
decision because we believed it amounted to an 
unacknowledged change in policy in contravention of the 
APA.  See CBS, 535 F.3d at 187 (describing Young as ―the 
Commission‘s initial effort to abandon its restrained 
enforcement policy on fleeting material‖).  We held, in other 
words, that Young Broadcasting could not have validly 
changed the FCC‘s policy with regard to fleeting material and 
could not therefore have relieved the FCC of the obligation to 
acknowledge and explain its new policy.  As noted, however, 
I would revisit and revise our APA conclusion on the basis of 
Fox and no longer find that FCC policy historically 
                                                                                                                                  
Young Broad., 19 FCC Rcd. at 1754–55, ¶¶ 10, 12 n.35; see 
also Industry Guidance 16 FCC Rcd. at 8003, ¶ 10 (stating, 
without any mention of a per se exemption for fleeting 
expletives, that under the FCC‘s analytical framework, ―[n]o 
single factor generally provides the basis for an indecency 
finding‖).  That Young Broadcasting overstated the historic 
scope of liability, however, does not preclude that case from 
furnishing adequate notice of broadcast licensees‘ potential 
liability for fleeting images; if anything, this error served to 
underscore the risk of liability.  The FCC‘s forfeiture order 
here reflected the FCC‘s understanding that all fleeting 
material would be subject to a contextual standard.  See 
Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2766, ¶12 (concluding that 
―even though we find that the partial nudity [broadcast at the 
end of the Halftime Show] was fleeting, the brevity of the 
partial nudity is outweighed by the first and third factors of 
our contextual analysis‖). 
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immunized fleeting material from regulation.
10
  The finding 
of indecency for the fleeting imagery in Young Broadcasting 
put CBS on notice that FCC policy did not afford fleeting 
images an automatic exemption from indecency regulation. 
My colleagues offer an alternate interpretation of 
Young Broadcasting as an application of ―an exception within 
the [per se] exception.‖11  Majority op. at 26.  They also 
believe that Young Broadcasting could not provide CBS with 
notice because it was a non-final notice of apparent liability.  
Id. at 19.  Both interpretations are inapposite.  The most 
straightforward reading of Young Broadcasting reveals the 
FCC applying a contextual standard rather than a set of nested 
exceptions, weighing all three factors with no one being 
determinative.
12
  Moreover, despite my colleagues‘ emphasis 
                                                          
10
 I will not address CBS‘s constitutional challenge to the 
indecency standard.  See infra Section IV. 
11
 It bears noting that the FCC in this case made the same 
finding as in Young Broadcasting that ―the material was 
apparently intended to pander to, titillate and shock viewers.‖  
Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2763, ¶ 3, 2766-67, ¶13,.  
If there is indeed an ―exception within the exception‖ for 
titillating and shocking content,  it would appear to apply in 
this instance as well. 
12
 My colleagues argue that the FCC recognized an exemption 
in Young Broadcasting because it cited prior FCC decisions 
concluding that the fleetingness of an image tended to weigh 
in favor of a finding of no liability.  Majority op. at 26.  But 
the FCC discussed fleetingness in Young Broadcasting in the 
context of the three-factor contextual standard.  See Young 
Broad., 17 FCC Rcd. at 1755 (―In particular cases, one or two 
of the factors may outweigh the others, either rendering the 
broadcast material patently offensive and consequently 
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on notice, this standard was not a new departure for the FCC.  
Young Broadcasting‘s use of a contextual standard is 
consistent with the FCC‘s 2001 Industry Guidance and the 
Court‘s account of FCC enforcement in Fox.  The case‘s 
unexceptional application of an established legal standard was 
sufficient to alert CBS to the possibility that fleeting images 
might be deemed indecent.  
Following Fox, I cannot say that the FCC changed its 
policy by applying its contextual, three-factor standard to a 
fleeting image.  Therefore I cannot join the majority‘s holding 
that the forfeiture orders were arbitrary and capricious under 
the APA.  Under Young Broadcasting, it was apparent before 
the Halftime Show that fleeting images could, depending on 
the context, be deemed indecent.  For this reason, CBS was 
adequately on notice of the policy the FCC applied in this 
case. 
III. 
 Whether Jackson and Timberlake‘s performance was 
indecent is a distinct question from whether CBS can be held 
liable for the live broadcast of that performance.  Because I 
would uphold the FCC‘s orders under the APA, the latter 
question, which we examined in our prior ruling, has 
heightened importance. 
A. 
                                                                                                                                  
indecent, or, alternatively, removing the broadcast material 
from the realm of indecency.  In this case, we examine all 
three factors. . . .‖ (footnote omitted)).  It did not state there 
was a per se exception for all fleeting images. 
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CBS challenges the ability of Congress or the FCC to 
regulate any indecency on broadcast television within the 
bounds of the First Amendment.  It contends technological 
change has undercut the traditional rationale for providing 
lesser protection to broadcasting in relation to other modes of 
speech.  In Pacifica, the plurality noted the scarcity of 
available frequencies and the need for licensing has always 
subjected broadcasters‘ speech to greater regulation—
including restrictions on speech that is indecent but not 
obscene.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (―[I]t is broadcasting 
that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection.  Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed 
except under laws that carefully define and narrow official 
discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of [its] license and 
[its] forum if the Commission decides that such an action 
would serve ‗the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.‘‖).  Pacifica noted that broadcast television is 
uniquely pervasive in American life and uniquely accessible 
to children.  Id. at 748-50.  Given the array of media currently 
available, CBS argues broadcast television no longer inhabits 
the unique and ubiquitous role in American society that the 
Court found made it deserving of lesser First Amendment 
protection.  Notwithstanding this criticism, the Supreme 
Court has given no hint it views subsequent technological 
changes as undermining Pacifica‘s rationale that the unique 
characteristics of this medium allows Congress to regulate 
indecent speech on broadcast television.   
B. 
After oral argument on remand, we requested 
supplemental briefing on the proper standard of scienter.  The 
FCC no longer presses theories of vicarious liability and non-
delegable duty we rejected in our prior decision.  Nor does it 
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appear to contest our prior judgment that CBS can be held 
liable only if it acted recklessly in broadcasting the offending 
image.  Accordingly, the FCC requests a remand so that it 
may determine whether CBS acted with the required mens 
rea.  CBS disputes the FCC‘s characterization of the scienter 
threshold and contends there is no factual basis for a 
forfeiture penalty. 
Congress has authorized the FCC to impose monetary 
forfeitures in several circumstances.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1).  Two provisions are relevant here.  Section 
503(b)(1)(B) permits a  penalty for ―willfully or repeatedly 
fail[ing] to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter 
or of any rule, regulation, or order issued by the Commission 
under this chapter,‖ and § 503(b)(1)(D) authorizes a forfeiture 
for ―violat[ing] any provision of section . . . 1464 . . . of Title 
18.‖  47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), (D).  Although the FCC 
referenced § 503(b)(1)(D), its forfeiture orders in this case 
appear to rest solely on the authority of § 503(b)(1)(B).  See, 
e.g., Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2776, ¶ 29 n.103 
(explaining that because the FCC had found CBS liable under 
§ 503(b)(1)(B), there was no need to ―address whether [CBS] 
could also be held responsible under Section 503(b)(1)(D)‖). 
Our previous opinion expressed skepticism about the 
applicability of § 503(b)(1)(B) to indecency violations.  CBS, 
535 F.3d at 203-04.  I would hold Congress intended the FCC 
to proceed under § 503(b)(1)(D) when sanctioning indecency 
violations.  ―Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts 
with a general one, the specific governs.‖  Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651, 657 (1997).  Here, § 503(b)(1)(B) 
speaks generally of violations of ―any of the provisions of this 
chapter or of any rule, regulation, or order issued by the 
Commission under this chapter.‖  Section 503(b)(1)(D), on 
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the other hand, refers specifically to having ―violated any 
provision of section . . . 1464 . . . of Title 18.‖   
The history of the forfeiture statute supports the view 
that Congress intended § 503(b)(1)(D) as the vehicle to 
impose forfeitures for airing indecent material.  Both 
forfeiture provisions were originally enacted as part of the 
same set of amendments to the Communications Act.  See 
Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-
752, § 7, 74 Stat. 889, 894.  At the time of enactment, § 
503(b)(1)(B) could not have applied to indecency violations 
because 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was the only provision of federal 
law proscribing indecency; none of the ―provisions of th[e] 
chapter‖ containing § 503(b)(1)(B), nor ―any rule, regulation, 
or order issued by the Commission under th[at] chapter‖ 
addressed the subject of indecency.  The FCC has argued that 
47 C.F.R. § 73.3999, which was not promulgated until 1988, 
brought the indecency standard within the scope of § 
503(b)(1)(B).  But § 73.3999, which is entitled ―Enforcement 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464,‖ merely establishes the hours of the day 
when 18 U.S.C. § 1464 will be enforced.   Given the statutory 
history, I believe Congress intended violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
1464 to be enforced under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) and not § 
503(b)(1)(B).  And since 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 merely 
enforces 18 U.S.C. § 1464‘s substantive standard, it did not 
serve to bring indecency violations under the authority of § 
503(b)(1)(B). 
Even if § 503(b)(1)(B) were applicable to indecency 
actions, I am skeptical that it would authorize a forfeiture in 
this case.  The provision requires a showing that a licensee 
―willfully or repeatedly‖ violated a statutory or regulatory 
standard.  According to the statutory definition, ―the term 
‗willful,‘ when used with reference to the commission or 
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omission of any act, means the conscious and deliberate 
commission or omission of such act.‖  47 U.S.C. § 312(f).  
The FCC does not contend that CBS knew that Timberlake 
would expose Jackson‘s breast, or intended that display to 
occur.  Instead, the FCC believes CBS‘s actions were 
―willful‖ insofar as the network ―consciously and 
deliberately‖ failed to take precautions despite the alleged 
existence of a known or obvious risk that indecent material 
would be broadcast.  But since the act that must be ―willful‖ 
is, in this context, the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, it would 
appear that CBS cannot be held liable unless it ―consciously 
and deliberately‖ broadcast the specific material deemed 
indecent.  The FCC argues the act can be either a commission 
or omission—here (in the view of the FCC) the failure to take 
necessary precautions.  But even if an omission can support a 
finding of a violation of § 503(b)(1)(B), the omission still 
must be ―willful.‖  The reckless omission of ―precautions‖ 
would seem insufficient to satisfy the willfulness requirement 
of § 503(b)(1)(B). 
Although I would find the FCC‘s orders relied on 
inapposite statutory authority, I do not believe this error 
precludes the FCC from applying § 503(b)(1)(D) on remand.  
See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429, 430 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (remanding rulemaking where the FCC had relied on 
an inapposite statutory provision ―[b]ecause there may well 
be other legal bases for adopting the rules chosen by the 
Commission‖); see also Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 
F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (―If the agency decision is flawed 
by mistaken legal premises, . . . remanding to give the agency 
an opportunity to cure the error is the ordinary course.‖ 
(emphasis omitted)); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
200-01 (1947) (―The fact that the [agency] had committed a 
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legal error in its first disposition of the case certainly gave 
[the prejudiced party] no vested right to receive the benefits 
of such an order.‖).   
The Supreme Court has directed as a general matter: 
If the record before the agency does not 
support the agency action, if the agency has not 
considered all relevant factors, or if the 
reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the 
challenged agency action on the basis of the 
record before it, the proper course, except in 
rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency 
for additional investigation or explanation. 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 
(1985).  There have been few instances where courts have 
found ―rare circumstances.‖  One such circumstance is ―when 
there has been a strong showing in support of a claim of bad 
faith or improper behavior on the part of agency 
decisionmakers or where the absence of formal administrative 
findings makes such investigation necessary in order to 
determine the reasons for the agency's choice.‖  Sierra Club 
v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 369 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat‟l 
Audubon Soc‟y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997)).  
Of course, remand is not required where a proper application 
of the correct standard could yield only one possible result.  
See George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 
1539 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (―[W]e find that a remand would be 
futile on certain matters as only one disposition is possible as 
a matter of law.‖).  But where ―the answer the [agency] might 
give were it to bring to bear on the facts the proper 
administrative and statutory considerations‖ is ―[s]till 
unsettled,‖ remand is the proper course.  Chenery, 332 U.S. at 
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200.  As I believe, following Fox, the FCC did not act in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, whether CBS can be held 
liable for its broadcast of the Halftime Show is still 
unsettled.
13
  That is the case here; the ―function‖ of applying 
the proper liability standard to the facts of this case ―belongs 
exclusively to the Commission in the first instance.‖  Id.  
C. 
1. 
Section 503(b)(1)(D), unlike § 503(b)(1)(B), does not 
contain an express scienter requirement.  On remand, both 
parties agree that scienter is a prerequisite of liability under § 
503(b)(1)(D) and 18 U.S.C. § 1464, but they dispute what 
mental state is required.  The FCC contends that recklessness 
suffices, while CBS insists it can be liable only if it had 
knowledge the Halftime Show would contain indecent 
material and it intended to violate the indecency standard. 
In most criminal or civil actions for obscenity or 
indecency, the element of scienter as to the broadcast‘s 
content will not be in doubt as ―the defendant will necessarily 
know the contents of his utterances.‖  United States v. Smith, 
467 F.2d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1972).  Scienter will be an 
issue in forfeitures under § 1464, where, as here, live, 
unscripted events are broadcast.  The broadcaster may not 
have forewarning of a potentially-indecent unscripted or 
                                                          
13
 Accordingly, I believe, as our prior opinion held, that even 
if the FCC‘s forfeiture order were arbitrary and capricious, 
the FCC could on remand issue a finding of indecency 
without a civil forfeiture as it did in Golden Globes.  CBS, 
535 F.3d at 209. 
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spontaneous event.  Nor might the conduct of a third-party or 
independent contractor necessarily be imputed to the 
broadcaster.  Live broadcasts, as opposed to scripted or 
―taped‖ programming, will always carry the possibility or risk 
of transmitting indecent material.   
Against this backdrop, I believe recklessness is the 
constitutional minimum standard for scienter when imposing 
forfeiture penalties.  ―The presumption in favor of scienter 
requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea 
which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 
otherwise innocent conduct.‖  Carter v. United States, 530 
U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Recklessness provides sufficient protection under the First 
Amendment to speech in similar contexts.  See New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (allowing the 
imposition of liability upon a showing that the defendant 
published a statement with ―reckless disregard‖ of the risk it 
was false); see also CBS, 535 F.3d at 206–07 (citing Osborne 
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)) (―Also instructive here are 
other cases determining recklessness to be an adequate level 
of scienter for imposing liability in related First Amendment 
contexts where speech or expression is restricted based on its 
content.‖).14   
Imposing a higher scienter standard than recklessness, 
such as the actual knowledge or intent standard urged by 
CBS, dilutes the duty imposed by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                          
14
 At common law, the concept of recklessness could be 
expressed in a variety of ways.  Historically, terms such as 
malicious or wanton ―were used interchangeably with 
recklessness.‖  David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the 
Model Penal Code, 9 Am. J. Crim. L. 281, 293 (1981).  
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1464 and risks creating an end-around indecency 
restrictions.
15
  Such a standard could permit ―willful 
                                                          
15
 CBS also argues that the FCC must show it specifically 
intended to violate the indecency prohibition in § 1464.  CBS 
relies on pre-Pacifica case law addressing prosecutions for 
scripted broadcasts of obscene or indecent material.  See 
United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).  
These cases have limited value as they address criminal 
prosecutions for scripted content.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 
747 n.25 (Stevens, J., plurality op.) (differentiating precedents 
addressing criminal prosecutions and the First Amendment by 
noting ―[e]ven the strongest civil penalty at the Commission‘s 
command does not include criminal prosecution‖).  
Furthermore, Pacifica did not require the FCC show specific 
intent for the civil forfeiture at issue there nor did the Court 
cite to any of the cases on which CBS relies. 
Even under the pre-Pacifica cases, this ―specific 
intent‖ requirement of § 1464 is satisfied if one should have 
known the utterance or broadcasting of such speech would 
violate the law.  In Tallman v. United States, upon which 
CBS relies, the Seventh Circuit in interpreting § 1464 
concluded that ―specific intent‖ is present under the standard 
traditionally used at common law ―if the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that uttering the words he did 
over the air was a public wrong.‖  465 F.2d at 288; see also 
Smith, 467 F.2d at 1130 n.2 (citing Tallman for the 
proposition ―an appropriate instruction as to specific intent 
under this statute might be that ‗the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that uttering the words he did 
over the air was a public wrong‘‖).  Even these pre-Pacifica 
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blindness‖ or allow broadcasters to fail to take reasonably 
available precautions (such as implementing delay 
technologies) despite any obvious risks, and then evade 
responsibility if indecent material is broadcast, claiming they 
neither intended nor were aware that the indecent material 
would be broadcast.  End runs might also be effected through 
the use of independent contractors.  Accordingly, I do not 
believe liability for indecent broadcasts requires a showing of 
actual knowledge, actual awareness, or intent on the part of 
the broadcaster.
16
 
2. 
The question remains what is the proper standard of 
recklessness under § 1464.  As an alternative argument, CBS 
                                                                                                                                  
precedents addressing criminal prosecutions recite an 
―objective‖ or ―reasonable person‖ standard for scienter. 
16
 The cases cited by CBS in defense of its proposed mens rea 
standard are inapposite, because in each case Congress had 
already provided a scienter standard as to some elements of 
the statutory offense.  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 
129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009); United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).  In each of these cases, the statute in 
question contained some mental state language, such as 
―knowingly,‖ that when read naturally did not appear to 
modify all the elements in the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2252.  The Court only addressed 
whether the express scienter term applied to every element of 
the statutory offense or whether the term modified a single 
element of the offense.  These cases do not address what 
mental state requirement should be read into provisions like 
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) and 18 U.S.C. § 1464 that contain 
no mens rea language whatsoever. 
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contends there is more than one possible definition of 
recklessness, and the more demanding criminal standard 
ought to apply here.  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless 
who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails 
to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of 
harm that is either known or so obvious that it 
should be known.  The criminal law, however, 
generally permits a finding of recklessness only 
when a person disregards a risk of harm of 
which he is aware. 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37 (internal citations omitted); see 
also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 n.18 
(2007) (―Unlike civil recklessness, criminal recklessness also 
requires subjective knowledge on the part of the offender.‖).   
In my view, the FCC may on remand seek a civil 
forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D), but CBS‘s alleged 
liability is predicated on its violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a 
criminal statute.  For this reason, CBS contends the level of 
scienter cannot vary based on whether the FCC pursues civil 
remedies or the Department of Justice charges criminal 
offenses.  Notwithstanding the civil character of the forfeiture 
action, CBS contends it can be held liable for a forfeiture 
penalty only if it were criminally reckless—if it disregarded 
an unjustifiably high risk of broadcast indecency of which it 
was aware.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37.  The FCC counters 
that in Pacifica the Supreme Court already interpreted the 
standard for civil forfeitures for indecency violations 
independent from § 1464‘s criminal applications, making 
clear the civil recklessness standard applies.    
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I believe a civil standard best comports with 
Congressional intent.  In 1960, Congress expanded the civil 
forfeiture provisions of the Federal Communications Act to 
allow the FCC greater flexibility to regulate the broadcast 
medium.  Before the 1960 Act, the FCC‘s regulatory tools 
were limited to revoking the broadcaster‘s license or asking 
the Department of Justice to commence criminal 
proceedings.
17
  Communication Act Amendments, 1960, H.R. 
Rep. No. 86-1800, at 17.  The FCC asked Congress to 
―provide it with an effective tool in dealing with violations 
where revocation or suspension does not appear to be 
appropriate.‖  Id.  The House Report explaining the 
amendments indicated that to achieve the desired flexibility 
the civil forfeiture provisions should be read as independent 
from other enforcement provisions.  The Report states ―the 
FCC will not be precluded from ordering a forfeiture merely 
because another type of sanction or penalty has been or may 
be applied to the licensee or permittee.‖  Id.   
The most telling argument in favor of a civil standard 
is the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Pacifica.  As noted by the 
FCC, the plurality in Pacifica recognized that Congress 
intended the civil provisions of the Communications Act to be 
interpreted and applied apart from the criminal provisions.  
The plurality stated in footnote 13: 
The statutes authorizing civil penalties 
incorporate § 1464, a criminal statute.  See 47 
                                                          
17
 Prior to 1960, § 503 only authorized forfeitures for 
accepting rebates or offsets that deviated from the tariff rates 
for the transmission of wire or radio messages.  Federal 
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 503, 48 
Stat. 1064, 1101 (1934). 
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U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 312(b)(2), and 
503(b)(1)(E) (1970 ed. and Supp. V).  But the 
validity of the civil sanctions is not linked to the 
validity of the criminal penalty.  The legislative 
history of the provisions establishes their 
independence.  As enacted in 1927 and 1934, 
the prohibition on indecent speech was separate 
from the provisions imposing civil and criminal 
penalties for violating the prohibition.  Radio 
Act of 1927, §§ 14, 29, and 33, 44 Stat. 1168 
and 1173; Communications Act of 1934, §§ 
312, 326, and 501, 48 Stat. 1086, 1091, and 
1100, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 326, and 501 (1970 ed. 
and Supp. V).  The 1927 and 1934 Acts 
indicated in the strongest possible language that 
any invalid provision was separable from the 
rest of the Act.  Radio Act of 1927, § 38, 44 
Stat. 1174; Communications Act of 1934, § 
608, 48 Stat. 1105, 47 U.S.C. § 608.  Although 
the 1948 codification of the criminal laws and 
the addition of new civil penalties changed the 
statutory structure, no substantive change was 
apparently intended.  Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162.  Accordingly, 
we need not consider any question relating to 
the possible application of § 1464 as a criminal 
statute. 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739 n.13.  Under Pacifica, the level of 
scienter to prove a violation of § 1464 need not be the same 
for both criminal and civil applications.  Of course, the 
respective penalties are different.  Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1464 carries a statutory maximum penalty of up to two years 
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imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000 for individuals and 
$500,000 for organizations.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 3571(b)-(c).  
At the time of the alleged violation,
18
 a forfeiture under 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) carried a maximum forfeiture of §27,500 
for each station.  Reconsideration Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 
6654, ¶ 2.  As the FCC found twenty stations aired the 
indecent material in the Halftime Show, it imposed a 
forfeiture on CBS of $550,000 (twenty violations at the 
maximum $27,500 per violation).  Id. 
CBS relies on FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 
U.S. 284 (1954).  In ABC, the FCC desired to ban ―give 
away‖ contests where radio and television stations would 
distribute prizes to listeners and viewers who called in and 
correctly answered a question or solved a puzzle.  347 U.S. at 
286-87.  To this end, the FCC promulgated regulations 
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which prohibits broadcasting  
―any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, 
gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent 
in whole or in part upon lot or chance.‖  Id. at 285.  The FCC 
defined games of chance to include ―give away‖ contests.  Id. 
at 286.  Prior to adopting the regulation, the FCC had failed to 
persuade the Department of Justice to pursue criminal actions 
against such programs and had urged Congress 
unsuccessfully to amend the law.  Id. at 296.  Additionally, 
the Post Office, which administered a similar statute 
involving the mails, and the Department of Justice had 
                                                          
18
 In 2006, Congress added 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C) which 
raised maximum penalties for those found ―to have broadcast 
obscene, indecent, or profane language‖ to $325,000 per 
violation, not to exceed an aggregate of $3 million for any 
single act of failure to act.  Broadcast Decency Enforcement 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, 120 Stat. 491, 491 (2006).  
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interpreted the same statutory language to exclude the type of 
program the FCC wished to regulate.  Id. at 294.  The Court 
concluded ―[t]here cannot be one construction for the Federal 
Communications Commission and another for the 
Department of Justice.‖  Id. at 296; see also Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11-12 n.8 (2004); United States v. 
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 506-07 (1992) 
(plurality).
19
  CBS contends we must construe § 1464 in the 
exact same manner as if this were a criminal prosecution.
20
 
There is some merit in CBS‘s position that, as a 
general matter, a statute should be read consistently in its 
criminal and civil applications.   But in ABC (and also Leocal 
and Thompson), the Court construed the literal text of a 
statute, finding no good reason to apply different 
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 In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), when interpreting 
the definition of ―crime of violence‖ contained in 18 U.S.C. § 
16 as applied to a civil deportation proceeding, the Court 
noted that if the definition were ambiguous it would apply the 
rule of lenity used in criminal proceedings because the statute 
―has both criminal and noncriminal applications.‖  Id. at 12 
n.8.  Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms 
Co., the Court had to define when a firearm was ―made‖ to 
determine if a tax on the ―making‖ was owed to the 
government.  504 U.S. 505, 506-07 (1992) (plurality).  To 
resolve the issue, the Court applied the rule of lenity because 
―although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil 
setting, the [statute] has criminal applications.‖  Id. at 517; 
see also id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
20
 Justice Stewart‘s dissent raised the argument CBS raises 
here that the statute must be read in keeping with ABC, 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 780 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting), a 
proposition the plurality rejected in footnote 13. 
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constructions for civil actions and criminal prosecutions.  In 
this case, there is no text to interpret.  The statutes (18 U.S.C 
§ 1464 and 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D)) are silent on scienter; 
as a consequence, we must apply the constitutionally required 
level of scienter.  Furthermore, ―[i]f [Congress‘s] intent is 
made plain, it is unnecessary for us to refer to other canons of 
statutory construction, and indeed we should not do so.‖  In re 
Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d 246, 254-55 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  As I have noted, the Supreme Court in Pacifica 
concluded Congress intended the specific provision at issue to 
be interpreted for civil forfeitures without regard to its 
application in criminal prosecutions.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 
739 n.13.  Accordingly, I would read into the statute only the 
scienter necessary in this context for a civil forfeiture order—
the objective standard of civil recklessness. 
3. 
If we were to reject, as I think we should, CBS‘s 
arguments under the APA, at issue would be whether the 
standard of recklessness for a civil forfeiture under 
§503(b)(1)(D) is subjective (knowledge or awareness of an 
unjustifiably high risk of harm) or objective (should have 
been aware of such a risk).  I believe an objective standard for 
recklessness is sufficient to separate wrongful from otherwise 
innocent conduct.
21
  Adoption of a subjective standard, 
                                                          
21
 In practice the distinction between a subjective or an 
objective standard may not always result in differences on 
liability.  The law has traditionally allowed the use of 
objective evidence to prove a party‘s subjective state of mind.  
See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1090 
(3d Cir. 1988) (―[O]bjective circumstantial evidence can 
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namely that for live television broadcasts the broadcaster 
must know or be aware indecency will occur, risks 
encouraging deliberate ignorance or failure to use available 
preventive measures such as delay technology.   
In addition to comporting with Congress‘s intent in 
creating the civil forfeiture provision of § 503(b)(1)(D), a 
civil recklessness standard provides protection commensurate 
with indecency‘s constitutional status.  The First Amendment 
requires we apply ―only that mens rea which is necessary to 
separate wrongful conduct from ‗otherwise innocent 
conduct.‘‖  Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) 
                                                                                                                                  
suffice to demonstrate actual malice.‖).  The Supreme Court 
has noted: 
We might observe that it has been some time 
now since the law viewed itself as impotent to 
explore the actual state of a man‘s mind.  See 
[Roscoe] Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 1 [1954].  Cf. American 
Communications Ass‟n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 
U.S. 382, 411 [1950].  Eyewitness testimony of 
a bookseller‘s perusal of a book hardly need be 
a necessary element in proving his awareness of 
its contents. The circumstances may warrant the 
inference that he was aware of what a book 
contained, despite his denial. 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959);  see also 
Colorado v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 220 (Colo. 2000) (―In 
addition to the actor‘s knowledge and experience, a court may 
infer the actor‘s subjective awareness of a risk from what a 
reasonable person would have understood under the 
circumstances.‖).  
 
51 
 
(quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72).  The issue 
presents a difficult question of constitutional law, as the 
plurality in Pacifica noted when it stated, ―the constitutional 
protection accorded to a communication containing such 
patently offensive sexual and excretory language need not be 
the same in every context‖ and noted the Court ―tailored its 
protection‖ of speech ―to both the abuses and the uses to 
which it might be put.‖  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 & n.24.  At 
a minimum, the FCC must show CBS had a sufficient level of 
culpability to justify a civil forfeiture.  Because displays of 
indecent material ―surely lie at the periphery of the First 
Amendment concern‖ an objective standard is appropriate.  
Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743).  
Furthermore, an objective standard is not without precedent.
22
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 In other areas such as use of ―fighting words‖—words 
inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction—the Court has 
looked at what reaction a reasonable speaker would expect 
from the utterance of her speech.  See Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).  Recent Supreme 
Court cases have reaffirmed that some categories of speech 
are entitled to lesser or even no constitutional protection.  
There are traditional, though limited, categories where the 
First Amendment has not protected those who would 
―disregard these traditional limitations.‖  United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (internal quotation 
omitted).  These categories (including obscenity) ―are ‗well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem.‘‖  Id. (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).   
Unlike obscenity, indecency enjoys some 
constitutional protection, but of a lesser kind.  See Pacifica, 
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It is not sufficient to show that CBS should have acted 
differently or was merely negligent.  Inadvertence or common 
negligence will not suffice.  CBS contends there is no 
evidence to support a finding that it acted recklessly.  But this 
is a question of proof committed to the FCC in the first 
instance.  CBS and the FCC continue to contest critical 
issues.   One consideration is the availability of delay 
technology.  CBS and the FCC dispute whether video delay 
technology could have been implemented at the time of the 
incident.  They also dispute whether CBS should have 
anticipated that indecent material could be broadcast—e.g., 
whether Jackson‘s choreographer‘s ―shocking moments‖ 
prediction should have put CBS on notice.  Since the FCC 
appears to have based its forfeiture orders on an erroneous—
or, at the least, unclear—standard of liability, after rejecting 
CBS‘s APA arguments, I would remand to allow the agency 
to measure CBS‘s conduct against the proper mens rea 
standard. 
IV. 
In addition to the arguments addressed, CBS contests 
the FCC‘s forfeiture orders on the ground that the agency‘s 
multi-factor, contextual indecency standard is 
unconstitutionally vague.  In its most recent decision in Fox, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
endorsed this view, see Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 
                                                                                                                                  
438 U.S. at 748 (―Patently offensive, indecent material 
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in 
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the 
individual‘s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.‖).  An objective standard 
comports with this peripheral status. 
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613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), and CBS encourages us to 
follow suit.  In Fox, however, the constitutional question was 
the primary, if not exclusive, issue left in the case after the 
Supreme Court‘s remand.  Here, it may be possible to dispose 
of the action without resolving the constitutional question. 
―A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial 
restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional 
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.‖  
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 
445 (1988).  Therefore, I would not address the constitutional 
issue.     
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would grant the petition 
for review, vacate the FCC‘s forfeiture orders, and remand for 
consideration of the forfeiture order under the proper 
standard. 
